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Triangular Treaties: The Extent and Limits of
Investment Treaty Rights
Anthea Roberts*
Investment treaties should be reconceptualized as triangular treaties, i.e., agreements between sovereign
states that create enforceable rights for investors as non-sovereign, third-party beneficiaries. State A (the
host state) agrees to provide certain protections to investors coming from State B (the home state) and vice
versa. If the investor considers that these protections have been violated, investment treaties also grant the
investor permission to bring an arbitral claim directly against the host state. As a result, the agreement is
entered into by the home and host state (collectively, the treaty parties) but the protections are created for
the benefit of, and are typically enforced by, an investor from one state against the other state.
Investment treaties expressly protect investors against certain unilateral actions by host states, such as
expropriation without compensation (first-order questions). It is unclear, however, whether they also protect
investors against unilateral actions by home states (second-order questions) and/or collective actions by the
treaty parties (third-order questions). These questions are becoming important in a range of existing and
emerging controversies, including: whether a home state can settle an investor’s claim without the investor’s
consent; whether a host state can rely on inter-state countermeasures against a home state as a defense in an
investor-state dispute; and whether the treaty parties can jointly terminate an investment treaty with
immediate effect?
To answer these questions, I propose a new triangular framework that draws on principles from public
international law, third-party beneficiary doctrines, and public law in a way that captures the unique,
hybrid nature of investment treaties. Investment treaties are international agreements between states (hence
the need for a public international law premise), but they depart from typical treaties by granting investors
enforceable rights instead of simply regulating state-to-state rights and obligations (hence the need for a
third-party beneficiary paradigm). Unlike traditional contract law models, however, they involve an
agreement by sovereign parties to bestow rights on a non-sovereign entity (hence the need for a public law
qualification).
This triangular approach focuses our attention on the interests and intentions of the treaty parties,
rather than the interests or expectations of investors. States are not benevolent actors; rather, they grant
enforceable rights to investors as third parties in order to effectuate their own goals. Recognizing this
requires us to rethink traditional accounts of the two main goals of investment treaties: investor protection
and the depoliticization of investment disputes. Drawing on this triangular framework and these revised
purposes, I propose default rules for resolving a range of controversies about what rights have been given to
investors and what powers have been retained by states, focusing in particular on the under-theorized
second- and third-order relationships and the three unresolved controversies identified above.
Introduction
Investment treaties should be reconceptualized as triangular treaties, i.e.,
agreements between sovereign states that create enforceable rights for inves-
tors as non-sovereign, third-party beneficiaries. State A (the host state)
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agrees to provide certain protections to investors coming from State B (the
home state) and vice versa. If the investor considers that these protections
have been violated, investment treaties also grant the investor permission to
bring an arbitral claim directly against the host state. As a result, the agree-
ment is entered into by the home and host state (collectively, the treaty
parties) but the protections are created for the benefit of, and are typically
enforced by, an investor from one state against the other state.
There is a tendency to understand these treaties as creating two bilateral
relationships. The first is a treaty relationship between the treaty parties at
the inter-state level. The second is a contractual relationship between the
investor and host state that governs the arbitral dispute in a particular case
after the investor accepts the host state’s standing offer to arbitrate.1 How-
ever, this bifurcated approach proves inadequate when it comes to analyzing
questions about the relationship between (1) investors and their home states
and (2) investors and the treaty parties acting collectively. For that, we need
a theory that conceptualizes the triangular relationship between investors,
home states, and host states as part of an integrated whole.2
The literature and case law to date have focused primarily, though not
exclusively, on what I call “first-order” questions about the relationship be-
tween investors and host states because these questions are the most likely to
arise in investor-state arbitrations. This results in a focus on substantive
questions, such as what constitutes indirect expropriation, and procedural
questions, such as whether an investor has complied with the jurisdictional
requirements to bring an arbitral claim. By contrast, this Article focuses
primarily on what I term “second-order” questions, which concern relations
between investors and their home states acting individually, and “third-
order” questions, which concern relations between investors and the treaty
parties acting collectively.3
Investment treaties expressly protect investors against certain unilateral
actions by host states, such as expropriation without compensation and dis-
criminatory treatment, and permit investor-state arbitration to enforce these
obligations. However, it is unclear whether they also protect investors
against certain unilateral actions by home states and collective actions by the
1. The ability of investors to accept this offer by bringing an arbitral claim is typically analyzed
through the notion of arbitration without privity. See Jan Paulsson, Arbitration Without Privity, 10 ICSID
Rev. 232 (1995); Christoph H. Schreuer et al., The ICSID Convention: A Commentary 190–92 (2d ed.
2009); Christoph H. Schreuer, The ICSID Convention: A Commentary 192, 206 (2001).
2. Anthea Roberts, Power and Persuasion in Investment Treaty Interpretation: The Dual Role of States, 104
Am. J. Int’l L. 179, 182–84 (2010).
3. I do not use the phrase first-, second-, and third-order relationships to suggest any order of priority
between these relationships. I view the relevant framing transaction as the inter-state treaty relationship,
which establishes the rules governing each of these investor-state relationships. I refer to the relationship
between investors and host states as the first-order relationship because it is the one that has been given
the most attention to date given that it arises most frequently in investor-state disputes. However, that
does not mean that it is more important than or logically proceeds what I refer to as the second- and
third-order relationships.
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treaty parties. These questions arise with respect to a range of existing and
emerging controversies, including:
• Can a home state bring and settle a class action claim on behalf
of its investors against the host state in which they invested, if
it acts without the knowledge or consent of its investors?
• Can a host state excuse its treaty violation in an investor-state
arbitration on the basis that its action was a lawful countermea-
sure in response to a previous violation by the investor’s home
state?
• Can the treaty parties agree to jointly terminate or amend an
investment treaty with immediate effect and thereby avoid the
ten to twenty year survival clause that typically applies to uni-
lateral terminations?
To answer these issues, we must confront fundamental and unanswered
questions about what rights have been given to investors and what powers
have been retained by home and host states acting individually and the
treaty parties acting collectively.
It may come as a surprise to those unfamiliar with the field that invest-
ment treaties do not answer these basic questions. But they do not. On a
substantive level, investment treaties impose certain obligations on host
states to provide protections to foreign investors and investments, but they
do not clarify whether these obligations give rise to substantive rights for
the investor, the home state, or both. On a procedural level, investment
treaties typically contain two dispute resolution clauses—one permitting in-
vestor-state arbitration over investment disputes; and the other permitting
state-to-state arbitration over disputes concerning the treaty’s interpretation
and/or application—but most say nothing about how these two forms of
dispute resolution should interact.4
Existing approaches to these questions focus on the nature of investment
treaty rights, i.e., whether investors have been granted rights and, if so,
whether these are substantive and/or procedural in nature. Three main pos-
sibilities have been mooted:
(1) Investment treaties grant substantive and procedural rights to
the treaty parties only, but investors are permitted for the
sake of convenience to enforce their home states’ substantive
rights (“derivative” rights thesis);
(2) Investment treaties grant substantive rights to the treaty par-
ties only, but investors are granted the procedural right to
enforce their states’ substantive rights (“intermediate” thesis
or “contingent” rights); and
4. On both points, see Anthea Roberts, State-to-State Investment Treaty Arbitration: A Hybrid Theory of
Interdependent Rights and Shared Interpretive Authority, 55 Harv. Int’l L.J. 1 (2014).
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(3) Investment treaties grant substantive and procedural rights to
investors, giving investors a procedural right to enforce their
own substantive rights (“direct” rights thesis).5
These approaches are inadequate for conceptualizing the extent and limits
of investment treaty rights for two reasons. First, they typically focus on
what rights investment treaties bestow on investors: are investors granted no
rights, procedural rights only, or substantive and procedural rights? How-
ever, in order to fully comprehend the architecture of investment treaties
and their full allocation of rights and powers, we need to understand both
sides of the coin, i.e., what rights have been granted to investors and what
powers have been retained by states. The extent and limits of the former
cannot be conceptualized in isolation from the latter.6
Second, and relatedly, existing theories tend to assume that if investors
have been granted rights, these are absolute and cannot be limited. For in-
stance, if investment treaties grant substantive and procedural rights to in-
vestors, inter-state countermeasures are ipso facto impermissible because
they would infringe upon investors’ rights. By contrast, if investment trea-
ties do not grant investors such rights, inter-state countermeasures are in
theory permissible because the rights remain state-to-state.7 But the treaty
parties can have granted rights to investors that are absolute, conditional, or
subject to limitations. Whether or not a right exists is a different question
to whether or not that right is immune from all powers of interference.
Instead, I contend that investment treaties should be reconceptualized as
triangular treaties, i.e., agreements between sovereign states that create en-
forceable rights for investors as non-sovereign, third-party beneficiaries. This
triangular framework draws on principles from public international law, do-
mestic contract law, and public law in a way that captures the unique, hy-
brid nature of investment treaties. Investment treaties are international
agreements between states (hence the need for a public international law
premise), but they depart from typical treaties by granting investors enforce-
able rights instead of simply regulating state-to-state rights and obligations
(hence the need for a third-party-beneficiary paradigm). Unlike traditional
contract law models, however, they involve an agreement by sovereign par-
5. Zachary Douglas, The Hybrid Foundations of Investment Treaty Arbitration, 74 Brit. Y.B. Int’l L.
151, 151–55 (2003); Zachary Douglas, The International Law of Investment Claims 6–10
(2009); Tillmann Rudolf Braun, Globalization-Driven Innovation: The Investor as a Partial Subject in Public
International Law, 15 J. World Investment & Trade, 73, 83–89 (2014). These possibilities have also
been framed through the models of agency, human rights, and third-party-beneficiary law. See Martins
Paparinskis, Investment Treaty Arbitration and the (New) Law of State Responsibility, 24 Eur. J. Int’l L. 617,
621–27 (2013).
6. For instance, investment treaties grant investors the right to bring investor-state claims but they
also give treaty parties the power to bring state-to-state claims. See Roberts, supra note 4. R
7. See generally N. Jansen Calamita, Countermeasures and Jurisdiction: Between Effectiveness and Fragmenta-
tion, 42 Geo. J. Int’l L. 233 (2010); Martins Paparinskis, Investment Arbitration and the Law of Counter-
measures, 79 Brit. Y.B. Int’l L. 264 (2008).
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ties to bestow rights on a non-sovereign entity (hence the need for a public
law qualification).
By reconceptualizing investment treaties as triangular treaties, I move the
debate away from existing questions about the nature of investment treaty
rights (i.e., whether investment treaties grant investors substantive and/or
procedural rights) and toward a more nuanced account of the extent and
limits of those rights. In doing so, I create a template for treaty negotiators
wishing to clarify whether and to what extent investment treaties regulate
investor-state relations on the three different levels identified above.
The problem with the investment treaty system is not that treaty parties
could not expressly regulate these second- and third-order relationships; it is
that they signed more than 3,000 investment treaties without doing so. The
question thus becomes what default rules should apply so that investment
tribunals can resolve gaps and ambiguities in existing treaties, and treaty
parties can have clear and fair background rules against which they can ne-
gotiate future treaties. Working from first principles, I develop a theory
about how untailored default rules should be formulated from the perspec-
tive of “ideal” treaty parties, which I define as states with equal interests as
both capital importers and capital exporters. Ideal treaty parties are able to
internalize the pros and cons of different investment rules in a way that is
likely to produce fair and balanced default rules as judged by the treaty
parties collectively.
Adopting the triangular framework is helpful when seeking to define de-
fault rules because it focuses our attention on the interests and intentions of the
treaty parties (as the contracting parties), rather than the interests or expecta-
tions of investors (as the third-party beneficiaries). States are not benevolent
actors; rather, they grant enforceable rights to investors as third parties in
order to effectuate their own goals. Recognizing this requires us to rethink
traditional accounts of the two main goals of investment treaties: investor
protection and the depoliticization of investment disputes. Ideal treaty par-
ties protect foreign investors as a means to the end of promoting foreign
investments, which is one element they must consider alongside others in
seeking to maximize social welfare. Their goal of depoliticizing disputes is
likewise concerned with protecting their interests as home and host states,
which involves enabling investor-state claims without necessarily disabling
host state actions or preventing joint treaty party actions.
Given their dual interests, ideal treaty parties have an incentive to adopt
interior solutions rather than embracing the extremes of complete or no in-
vestor protection. They are also likely to have an interest in striking a differ-
ent balance between investment protection and the preservation of state
sovereignty in each of the first-, second-, and third-order relationships iden-
tified above. Accordingly, I use my triangular framework and ideal treaty
party theory to propose default rules for resolving a range of questions about
the extent and limits of investors’ rights and treaty parties’ powers, focusing
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in particular on the under-analyzed second- and third-order relationships. I
then apply these rules to provide default answers to the three existing and
emerging controversies identified above.
I. The Case for Developing Default Rules
Identifying default rules for investment treaties is important for two rea-
sons. First, they provide a way of interpreting gaps and ambiguities in ex-
isting treaties. This is critical because investment treaties are incomplete
agreements; they are typically short, broadly worded, and do not address
important architectural issues, such as the relationship between investors
and home states and the treaty parties respectively. Second, default rules
provide the background rules against which treaty parties can negotiate fu-
ture agreements. This reduces transaction costs by providing a ready-made
set of solutions while at the same time respecting party autonomy because
treaty parties can contract around these rules if they do not suit their specific
interests.8
Framing default rules for interpreting existing investment treaties is com-
plicated by the fact that more than 3,000 investment treaties have been
signed and they often differ in minor or major ways. For instance, sometimes
a capital exporting state is able to get agreement on strong investment pro-
tections with few express carve-outs for state sovereignty. Early U.S. invest-
ment treaties often fit this model.9 Other times a capital importing state
will only agree to more limited investment protections and refuse to include
investor-state arbitration. Early Chinese investment treaties often fit this
model.10 There can be no one-size-fits-all approach to interpretation as states
have different interests and bargaining positions, and thus enter into differ-
ent investment treaties.
8. Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules,
99 Yale L.J. 87, 87 (1989).
9. See, e.g., Text of the U.S. Model Treaty concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of
Investment of February 24, 1984, 4 Berkeley J. Int’l L. 136 (1986), and Treaty between the Govern-
ment of the United States of America and the Government of [Country] Concerning the Encouragement
and Reciprocal Protection of Investment (1994), in Campbell McLachlan QC, Laurence Shore and
Matthew Weiniger, International Investment Arbitration: Substantive Principles, Appen-
dix 5, 386 (2007) along with investment treaties largely modeled on their terms, such as the Treaty
between the United States of America and the Argentine Republic Concerning the Reciprocal Encour-
agement and Protection of Investment, U.S.-Arg., Nov. 14, 1991, S. TREATY DOC. No. 103-2  and
the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Albania Con-
cerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, With Annex And Protocol, Signed
At Washington, Jan. 11, 1995, S. TREATY DOC. No. 104-19.
10. See, e.g., Agreement between the Government of Australia and the Government of the People’s
Republic of China on the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investments, July 11, 1988, arts.
III, XII; Agreement between Japan and the People’s Republic of China Concerning the Encouragement
and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, Aug. 1, 1988, arts. 2–4, 11; Agreement on the Encouragement
and Reciprocal Protection of Investments between the Government of the Republic of Korea and the
Government of the People’s Republic of China, Sept. 30, 1992, arts. 2–4, 9.
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Nonetheless, it is possible to formulate default rules in the investment
treaty system because, while the terms of individual treaties may differ, a lot
of commonality exists given that: (1) most investment treaties are based on a
relatively small number of model treaties, which have significant similarities
in their terms and structure; and (2) most investment tribunals interpret
investment treaties by reference to an emerging body of jurisprudence with-
out limiting their consideration to cases arising from the same treaty or from
treaties with identical provisions. As a result, the investment treaty system
is often bilateral in form but somewhat multilateral in substance, with both
common treaty terms and common interpretations frequently developing.11
In seeking to develop default rules, two principles guide my approach.
First, given the range of states with both different interests and levels of
power, and the diversity of potential treaty-party pairings, it is most helpful
to develop “untailored default” rules. “Tailored default” rules attempt to
provide what the particular treaty parties would have contracted for, whereas
“untailored default” rules ask what provisions most treaty parties would
prefer most of the time in most of their treaties.12 Good default rules need to
be efficient for a wide range of contracting parties because:
[P]arties in large economies are heterogeneous. Default rules
would be too expensive to create if efficient solutions were party-
specific. Then there would need to be as many legal rules as there
are sets of contracting parties. The task, then, is to find rules that
would be efficient . . . in a wide variety of contexts.13
Second, default rules should take seriously the interests of both home and
host states in order to reach fair and balanced terms as judged from the
collective perspective of both treaty parties rather than the self-interested
perspective of a single treaty party. This accords with Jonathan Bonnitcha’s
recent work developing first-order investment treaty rules from a “general”
and “impartial” perspective, which involves considering the costs and bene-
fits of investment treaties in general and from the perspective of all actors,
rather than with respect to a single treaty from the perspective of one self-
interested actor.14
In a world of perfect information and no transaction costs, the Coase theo-
rem suggests that contracting parties will be able to reach efficient outcomes
regardless of the initial allocation of property rights.15 In the real world,
however, states face imperfect information about how investment treaty
11. Stephan W. Schill, The Multilateralization of International Investment Law (2009).
12. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 8, at 91–92. R
13. Alan Schwartz & Robert Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 Yale L.J. 541,
598–99 (2003).
14. Jonathan Bonnitcha, Substantive Protection under Investment Treaties: a Legal
and Economic Analysis 8 –11 (2014).
15. R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & Econ. 1, 4 (1960); George J. Stigler, Two Notes on
the Coase Theorem, 99 Yale L.J. 631, 631 (1989).
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLI\56-2\HLI201.txt unknown Seq: 8 21-AUG-15 12:02
360 Harvard International Law Journal / Vol. 56
rights will be interpreted or what effect they will have. In addition to sub-
stantial transaction costs in negotiating investment treaties, it is often not
politically possible for states to make the sorts of transfers envisioned by the
Coase theorem. For these reasons, it is doubtful that the Coase theorem
applies.16
Instead, states with asymmetrical interests—as clear capital importers or
clear capital exporters—have entered into different treaties often reflecting
the strength of their relative bargaining power, as shown by the early U.S.
and Chinese investment treaties discussed above. These investment treaties
may be inefficient because they provide too much investor protection (as is
arguably the case with early U.S. treaties) or too little investor protection (as
is arguably the case with early Chinese treaties). However, they are signed
because they suit the interests of both parties given the inequality of bar-
gaining power against which the negotiation is conducted.
Over time, however, the interests of major states in the investment treaty
system have started to converge in a way that is having a distinct impact on
the evolution of investment treaty provisions. As Jose´ Alvarez has observed,
many states are increasingly becoming capital exporters (home states) as well
as capital importers (host states) and thus are beginning to more closely
approximate entities that find themselves in a situation analogous to Rawls’
original position:
More countries than ever before are, like the PRC [People’s Re-
public of China] and the United States, capital exporters as well as
capital importers. The position of such countries in the invest-
ment regime might be said to approximate that of the individual
in John Rawls’ “original position,” that is, someone who is placed
behind a veil of ignorance and does not know the social or eco-
nomic position she occupies within society and is therefore incen-
tivized to articulate principles of justice that are fair to all.17
For instance, the United States has gone from being primarily concerned
with protecting its investors as a home state to also being concerned about
protecting its regulatory freedom as a host state. By contrast, China has
undertaken the opposite trajectory, having gone from being primarily con-
cerned with protecting its sovereignty as a host state to also wanting to
protect its investors as a home state. As a result, more recent investment
treaties by both the United States and China seek to balance the interests of
home and host states in a way that was not true of their earlier treaties and
16. Bonnitcha, supra note 14, at 80–82. R
17. Jose´ E. Alvarez, The Once and Future Foreign Investment Regime, in Looking to the Future:
Essays on International Law in Honor of W. Michael Reisman 607, 634 (Mahnoush Arsanjani,
Jacob Katz Cogan, Robert D. Sloane, & Siegfried Wiessner eds., 2010).
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that comes closer to maximizing benefits from a joint home and host state
perspective.18
A similar development can be seen in recent Model Bilateral Investment
Treaties (Model BITs). States typically negotiate investment treaties from
pre-formulated Model BITs and many states are reluctant to depart from
their model. In developing a Model BIT, a state determines what rules it is
happy to accept in the absence of knowledge about whether it will have
greater interests as a home state or host state in relation to a particular
negotiation in the future. A state may still skew its approach if it knows
that it is more likely to end up on one side of the equation in most treaty
negotiations. However, the situation mimics the veil of ignorance to some
extent by encouraging states to develop balanced treaty terms that weigh
the gains and costs for both home and host states.
This can be seen most clearly in the evolution of the U.S. Model BIT.19
Early versions of the U.S. Model BIT were extremely investor protective.20
However, as the United States has come to recognize that it has significant
interests as a capital importing state, in addition to its clear interests as a
capital exporting state, it has transformed its Model BIT to provide a much
more calibrated approach that seeks to weigh investor protection against
state sovereignty rather than overly privileging either one.21 The United
States then uses its Model as a basis for negotiations with a wide range of
states where its relative interests as a capital importer and exporter are likely
to differ, from concluded negotiations with Rwanda and Uruguay to current
negotiations with China and the European Union.
Investment treaties also routinely include most-favored-nations clauses
that allow investors under one treaty to rely upon any more favorable terms
accepted by the host state in any other investment treaty. Thus treaty parties
not only have to consider whether they are happy with particular rules in the
context of that treaty, but also whether they are happy for investor-friendly
protections to be used in the context of any other treaty relationships they
form. Thus states have to consider their interests as home and host states in
general, not just in relation to that particular treaty, as investors can draw
18. For a discussion of the evolution of U.S. and Chinese investment treaties, see Alvarez, supra note
17, at 624–39; Cai Congyan, China-US BIT Negotiations and the Future of Investment Treaty Regime: A R
Grand Bargain with Multilateral Implications, 12 J. Int’l L. & Econ. 457 (2009); Stephan W. Schill,
Tearing Down the Great Wall: The New Generation Investment Treaties of the People’s Republic of China, 15
Cardozo J. Int’l & Comp. L. 73 (2007); Cai Congyan, Outward Foreign Direct Investment Protection and the
Effectiveness of Chinese BIT Practice, 7 J. World Inv. & Trade 621 (2006).
19. Jose´ E. Alvarez, The Evolving BIT, 4 Transnat’l Disp. Mgmt. 1 (2010); Jose´ E. Alvarez, Why Are
We ‘Re-calibrating’ Our Investment Treaties?, 4 World Arb. & Med. Rev. 143 (2010); Kenneth J. Vande-
velde, A Comparison of the 2004 and 1994 U.S. Model BITs: Rebalancing Investor and Host Country
Interests, in 2008-2009 Y.B. on Int’l L. & Pol’y 283 (Karl P. Sauvant ed., 2009).
20. See, e.g., 1984 U.S. Model BIT, supra note 9; 1994 U.S. Model BIT, supra note 9.
21. See, e.g., 2004 U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, available at http://www.state.gov/docu-
ments/organization/117601.pdf, and 2012 U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, available at http://
www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/BIT%20text%20for%20ACIEP%20Meeting.pdf [hereinafter 2012 U.S.
Model BIT].
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLI\56-2\HLI201.txt unknown Seq: 10 21-AUG-15 12:02
362 Harvard International Law Journal / Vol. 56
upon pro-investment rules from any treaty that is agreed to by the host
state.
Building on these developments, I argue that untailored default rules can
be developed by considering what terms would have been agreed to by
“ideal” treaty parties. I define “ideal” treaty parties as states that have equal
interests as both capital importers and capital exporters, both in general and
vis-a`-vis each other. The dual and equal interests of these states as capital
exporters and importers encourages them to internalize the risks and rewards
of investment treaties rather than internalizing some of the risks or rewards
and externalizing others. This pushes them to adopt fair and balanced provi-
sions, as judged from the perspective of both treaty parties, rather than cre-
ating a bias in favor of exporters or importers.
When viewed from a general perspective, investment treaties involve an
equal number of capital importers and capital exporters as foreign investors
always come from one state and invest in another. When viewed on an indi-
vidual level, ideal treaty parties replicate and internalize these interests be-
cause they represent contracting parties that have dual and equal interests as
capital importers and capital exporters. Thus, rules that will be fair and
balanced for the system in general should accord with the rules that ideal
treaty parties would select for their negotiating position. This perspective is
thus helpful in crafting untailored default rules against which specific pairs
of treaty parties with asymmetrical interests and unequal bargaining power
might wish to contract out.
Treaty parties may depart from default rules by expressly or impliedly
contracting around them. Where a particular treaty involves states with
asymmetric interests and unequal bargaining power, such departures might
be likely. However, we should not assume that departures from this default
point have been agreed unless they are express or can be clearly implied. Just
because a capital exporting state may have wanted greater protections for its
investors in a particular treaty does not mean that a capital importing state
did or would have agreed to such terms. Moreover, just because a capital
exporter may have had certain interests with respect to that particular treaty
does not mean that those terms would generally be in that state’s interests
across all of its treaties.
II. How to Model Triangular Treaties
How would ideal treaty parties approach the construction of investment
treaties? I contend that they would conceptualize investment treaties as tri-
angular treaties, i.e., agreements between sovereign states that create en-
forceable rights for investors as non-sovereign, third-party beneficiaries. To
flesh out this claim, I develop a hybrid theory of the extent and limits of
investment treaty rights based on: (1) a public international law premise; (2)
a third-party-beneficiary paradigm; and (3) a public law qualification.
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The hybridity of this approach captures the unique public/private nature
of investment treaties that both animates and vexes this immature field. It is
consistent with my previous call to develop “between the poles” solutions
that draw on a range of existing paradigms, instead of endorsing any single
one, including by developing underexplored notions of third-party-benefici-
ary rights.22 It also accords with Martins Paparinskis’ prediction that, al-
though not prevalent in current theorizing in the investment treaty system,
“the law of third parties may be pointing the finger to the future.”23
A. Public International Law Premise
I adopt a public international law paradigm as my premise because I as-
sume that investment treaties are entered into by sovereign states against
background assumptions about the powers of states and treaty parties. This
means that, if an investment treaty is silent on a particular issue, it is prima
facie appropriate to look to general international law rules, such as custom-
ary international law rules on diplomatic protection, treaty interpretation,
and state responsibility, to provide secondary rules, fill in gaps, and resolve
ambiguities. Treaty parties can expressly or impliedly depart from these
principles in their treaties, but the onus rests on those who are attempting
to show that such departures were intended or are otherwise justified.
The standard assumption in public international law is that states can
exercise diplomatic protection with respect to their nationals. Many of the
customary international law rules on this subject are embodied in the ILC’s
Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection.24 Traditionally, states have the
power to determine whether to bring a case on behalf of their nationals, how
to prosecute the case, whether and on what terms to settle, and what to do
with any resulting compensation.25 This approach makes sense in most areas
of international law where individuals have not been granted the power to
enforce their own rights or benefits before independent tribunals. However,
should the same freedom of the home state with respect to its nationals
continue if those nationals have been granted enforceable third-party rights?
22. See Anthea Roberts, Clash of Paradigms: Actors and Analogies Shaping the Investment Treaty System,
107 Am. J. Int’l L. 45, 92–93 (2013).
23. Martins Paparinskis, Investment Treaty Arbitration and the (New) Law of State Responsibility, 24 Eur.
J. Int’l L. 617, 625 (2013).
24. Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection with Commentaries, in Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, 58th
Sess., May 1–June 9, July 3–Aug. 11, 2006, U.N. Doc. A/61/10; GAOR, 61st Sess., Supp. No. 10, at
22–30 (2006) [hereinafter ILC Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection with Commentaries].
25. Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co. Ltd. (Belg. v. Spain), Judgment, 1970 I.C.J. 3, 44, ¶¶ 78
–79, (“[W]ithin the limits prescribed by international law, a State may exercise diplomatic protection by
whatever means and to whatever extent it thinks fit, for it is its own right that the State is asserting.
Should the natural or legal persons on whose behalf it is acting consider that their rights are not ade-
quately protected, they have no remedy in international law. All they can do is resort to municipal law, if
means are available, with a view to furthering their cause or obtaining redress . . . . The State must be
viewed as the sole judge to decide whether its protection will be granted, to what extent it is granted,
and when it will cease. It retains in this respect a discretionary power the exercise of which may be
determined by considerations of a political or other nature, unrelated to the particular case.”).
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Likewise, the standard assumption in treaty law is that treaty parties are
masters of their treaties. As set forth in the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties (VCLT),26 states enter into treaties and define the extent and
limits of their treaty obligations. States may influence the interpretation and
application of their treaties through subsequent interpretive agreements and
practices. States may also amend or terminate their obligations at any time
by mutual agreement. This approach makes sense when the treaty contains
rights and obligations for the treaty parties only. However, does this stan-
dard account require some modification in the investment treaty context
given the existence of investors as third-party beneficiaries?27
In a similar fashion, the rules for establishing the responsibility of states
are generally set out in the ILC’s Draft Articles on Responsibility of States
for Internationally Wrongful Acts.28 The Draft Articles on State Responsi-
bility provide guidance on an array of issues, including the circumstances in
which states can plead countermeasures as a circumstance precluding wrong-
fulness.29 Some of these rules, including those governing countermeasures,
are only applicable in relations between states and are “without prejudice to
any right, arising from the international responsibility of a State, which may
accrue directly to any person or entity other than a State.”30 Should the same
rules apply to investment treaties by way of analogy or should some modifi-
cations be adopted?
Investors seeking to invest in risky states are likely to be concerned about
two types of sovereign risk: undue interference by the host state, such as
expropriation of their property without compensation or discriminatory
treatment; and inadequate dispute resolution options, such as having to rely
upon local courts that are unwilling or unable to protect investor rights. In
order to promote investments as a means to the end of maximizing social
welfare, states may be incentivized to create investment treaties that protect
against these risks. To this end, states have entered into investment treaties
that impose substantive obligations of investor protection on host states
(often explained by the goal of “investor protection”)31 and provide for
state-to-state and investor-state dispute resolution options to enforce these
obligations (often explained by the goal of “depoliticizing investor-state
disputes”).32
26. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter
VCLT].
27. See Anthea Roberts, Subsequent Agreements and Practice: The Battle Over Interpretive Power, in Treaties
and Subsequent Practice 95, 101–02 (Georg Nolte ed., 2013).
28. ILC’s Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, in Rep. of the Int’l
Law Comm’n, 53d Sess., Apr. 23–June 1, July 2–Aug. 10, 2001, U.N. Doc. A/56/10; GAOR, 56th
Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 43 (2001) [hereinafter Draft Articles on State Responsibility].
29. Id., art. 49.
30. Id., art. 33(2).
31. See infra Part III.
32. See infra Part IV.
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Investors are thus granted protections as third-party beneficiaries and are
given the ability to enforce these benefits through investor-state arbitration.
To model this movement from a bilateral treaty that creates rights and obli-
gations for the treaty parties only, to a triangular treaty that creates enforce-
able rights for investors as third-party beneficiaries, it is useful to draw on
third-party-beneficiary doctrines that exist under both public international
law and domestic contract law.33
B. A Third-Party-Beneficiary Paradigm
1. Focusing on the Treaty and the Intentions of the Treaty Parties
Before modeling the movement from a bilateral to a triangular treaty
structure, two preliminary points should be kept in mind. First, the relevant
transaction for determining default treaty rules is the state-to-state treaty: it
provides the framework that governs the relationship between the treaty
parties and their nationals and foreign investors. As investment treaty inter-
pretive questions often arise in the context of investor-state arbitrations,
tribunals and academics have a tendency to focus on the investor’s invest-
ment in the host state as the relevant transaction. However, this puts the
cart before the horse. An investor may have a contract with the host state,
but they may not. An investor may have relied upon the investment treaty
in making an investment, but they may not. To bring an investment treaty
claim, no contract or reliance is required.34
Instead, the relevant legal transaction that establishes the treaty rights and
obligations at issue is the inter-state treaty, not any investor-state contract
or relationship based on the investor’s reliance. I leave to one side considera-
tions of whether and, if so, how investment treaty rights might be supple-
mented (or, more controversially, qualified) by contractual rights under an
investor-host state agreement. The relationship between treaty and contract
rights is highly contentious in practice and underdeveloped in theory.35 As
many investment treaty disputes do not involve investor-state contracts, and
as the terms of those contracts are often not public and/or differ tremen-
dously, I exclude them from consideration when determining how to de-
velop untailored default rules for interpreting investment treaties.
33. For an example of one other author who has relied upon the third-party-beneficiary paradigm but
failed to take seriously the system’s public international law premise or the need for a public law qualifi-
cation, see Fre´de´ric G. Sourgens, Keep the Faith: Investment Protection Following the Denunciation of Interna-
tional Investment Agreements, 11 Santa Clara J. Int’l L. 335 (2013).
34. The only requirements for an investor to bring an arbitral claim under an investment treaty is that
the investor (1) is a national of one of the treaty parties and (2) made (or, in the case of some treaties,
wished to make) an investment in the other treaty party.
35. See, e.g., Rudolf Dolzer & Christoph Schreuer, Principles of International Invest-
ment Law 168–75 (2d ed., 2012); James Crawford, Treaty and Contract in Investment Arbitration, 24 Arb.
Int’l 351 (2008); Julian Arato, Corporations as Lawmakers, 56 Harv. Int’l L.J. (forthcoming April
2015).
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Second, treaty parties will create enforceable rights for third parties when
it is in the interests of the treaty parties to do so. Accordingly, the relevant ques-
tion for determining what rights have been granted to third parties is not
“what is in the interests of the third party” or “what did the third party
legitimately expect?” A third party may have a strong interest in some-
thing, but that does not mean that the contracting parties will be incen-
tivized to protect that interest. A third party can only legitimately expect to
receive the rights or benefits that the treaty parties, acting jointly, would
have had an incentive to bestow. Whether those rights or benefits are suffi-
cient to encourage an investor to invest is relevant to whether the treaty is
effective as a matter of fact. Treaty parties will take this into account in
determining what protections it is in their interests to grant in order to
achieve their goals.
In focusing on the interests and intentions of the treaty parties, rather than the
interests or expectations of investors, we should start from the assumption that
the treaty parties will want a level of investment that produces the greatest
joint benefit; anything else would lower the overall surplus available to the
treaty parties. While it is generally recognized that too little investment
would not be jointly desired by the treaty parties, the converse is often not
appreciated. Too much investment is also suboptimal from the treaty par-
ties’ perspective. Offering unlimited investment protection would encourage
too much investment by insuring potential investors against risks and en-
couraging them to over invest. Thus optimal investment protection from
the perspective of ideal treaty parties is likely to require something between
no and full investor protection.36
In addition, even if the treaty parties intended to protect foreign investors
in order to promote foreign investments, we cannot assume that this is their
only goal or that they will pursue that goal at all costs. Treaty parties have
to balance their interest in promoting foreign investments against a range of
other economic and non-economic welfare interests, such as being able to
maintain control of their economies in times of crisis or pursue non-eco-
nomic goals, such as the protection of human health and the environment.
Promoting foreign investment is just one element in a complex calculus of
maximizing overall social welfare.37 Hence, our focus shifts from the one-
dimensional interests of investor (maximizing investor protection) to the
multi-faceted interests of the treaty parties (balancing investment promotion
and other welfare goals).
My focus on the treaty parties’ intentions and interests accords with
scholarly work on third-party-beneficiary doctrines under contract law. For
example, Melvin Eisenberg argues that a third-party beneficiary should have
the power to enforce a contract if allowing such enforcement would be a
36. See infra Part III.A.1.
37. See infra Part III.A.2.
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necessary or important means of effectuating the contracting parties’ per-
formance objectives.38 According to Eisenberg, “the purpose of allowing suit
by a third party is not to ensure that the third party realizes a benefit, but to
ensure that the contracting parties’ performance objectives are effectu-
ated.”39 Thus it is important to focus on what the treaty parties gain by
granting third-party enforcement, as that is key to understanding the extent
and limits of such a grant.
Similarly, according to Bob Scott and Alan Schwartz, the central question
that pervades third-party beneficiary law is when can a third party (here, the
investor) hold contract members (here, the treaty parties) liable for benefits
not received or costs incurred. They argue that, ex ante, contract members
would want the law to hold that third parties are beneficiaries when permit-
ting third-party enforcement would increase the expected payoffs of the con-
tract members.40 Again, this shifts the focus from what is in the interests of
the investor (absolute or high level investor protection) to what is in the
interests of the treaty parties (striking a balance between promoting foreign
investments and achieving other social welfare goals).
Of course, the investor and the investor’s home state are not entirely inde-
pendent entities, in contrast to what may occur in private law contracting.
Instead, they are defined by a public law relationship between a sovereign
and one of its nationals. If an ideal state is understood as having the interest
of furthering the welfare of its nationals, this includes their nationals who
wish to undertake foreign investments and their nationals who are not for-
eign investors. Home states—at least ideal ones—should internalize the in-
terests of their investors, though these interests will not be the only factors
that motivate them. These states also have to think about the interests of
their non-investing nationals, including in situations where the rules they
agree to limit their freedom of action as home and host states.
One of the advantages of defining the ideal type in this way is that the
interests of all of the relevant actors can be encompassed by focusing on the
interests of ideal treaty parties in a way that is not possible under ordinary
contract law where an actual or potential third-party beneficiary may be
subject to costs or benefits that are not fully internalized by the contracting
parties. It is likely, of course, that real states will not fully internalize the
interests of all of their nationals due to agency problems. This could be true
of their nationals that invest and that do not invest. It could be true of
democratic or non-democratic states. Nonetheless, in working out default
38. Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Third-Party Beneficiaries, 92 Colum. L. Rev. 1358, 1385 (1992); Melvin
A. Eisenberg, Foundational Principles of Contract Law (unpublished book chapter, on file with
author).
39. Eisenberg, supra note 38, at 1386. R
40. Alan Schwartz and Robert E. Scott, Third Party Beneficiaries and Contractual Networks (unpublished
paper, on file with author).
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rules, I define the ideal treaty parties as those that can internalize the inter-
ests of their nationals, including but not limited to their investors.
Even if real treaty parties do not fully internalize the interests of all of
their nationals, it is still important to focus on the intentions of the treaty
parties in determining the extent and limits of investment treaty rights.
That is because international law is based on the sovereign consent of states.
Unlike in domestic law, no higher legislative authority exists in interna-
tional law that is able to mandate states to protect the interests of non-state
parties, even if doing so would be more fair or efficient. Accordingly, if
investors are to have any rights under international law, they will be the
rights that states have granted to them through instruments like investment
treaties. This situation arguably differs from the human rights sphere where
there are arguments that individuals enjoy certain rights by virtue of being
human.41
2. Moving from a Bilateral to a Triangular Treaty Structure
In contract law, contracts were initially entered into by the contracting
parties and created rights and obligations for the contracting parties only.
Third parties could not enforce the contracts because they were not “in priv-
ity” with the contracting parties. Over time, however, domestic courts and
legislatures came to recognize that contracting parties may have an interest
in entering into contracts for the benefit of third parties and, on occasion,
may also have an interest in permitting that third party to directly enforce
those contractual terms. This led to the development of various doctrines
dealing with the rights of third-party beneficiaries under contract law. Al-
though third-party beneficiary contracts are well accepted and increasingly
common as a matter of practice, the doctrines regulating them are signifi-
cantly under-theorized.42
Public international law is on a similar trajectory. Treaties were initially
conceived as agreements between states that create rights and obligations for
the treaty parties only. Over time, it has become clear that states may wish
to enter into treaties that create rights or obligations for third parties, in-
cluding for third states (which could have been treaty parties) and for indi-
viduals and other non-state actors (which could not have been treaty parties).
For instance, the VCLT has certain provisions that deal with treaties that
create rights or obligations for third states.43 In international human rights
and criminal law, states have created treaty rights and obligations for indi-
viduals and, in some cases, have permitted direct enforcement by or against
41. Even if some rights in investment treaties also appear in certain human rights treaties, no credible
argument is made that investors have inherent or inalienable rights.
42. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 40 (“For many years, third-party-beneficiary law has languished in R
the backwaters of contract: the subject is rarely taught, has been given only minimal scholarly treatment
and has been completely ignored by law and economics scholars.”).
43. VCLT, supra note 26, arts. 34–37. R
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individuals.44 As in contract law, third-party beneficiary doctrines have re-
ceived little scholarly attention or theorizing under public international law.
States are masters of their treaties in the sense that they are the ones that
decide (1) whether to grant third parties enforceable rights or mere benefits
and (2) whether to make those rights absolute, conditional, or limited in
nature. They are also the ones that decide whether to delegate authority to
arbitral tribunals to interpret and apply these treaties. In line with the stric-
tures of public international law, tribunals must interpret the treaty’s provi-
sions “in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to
the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and
purpose.”45 Where the treaty parties have expressly dealt with a point, the
tribunal should defer to their decision in order to respect party autonomy.
Where the issue remains unaddressed, I contend that tribunals should con-
sider what default rules ideal treaty parties would likely have adopted if they
had considered the issue during the negotiations.
a. Enforceable Rights Not Mere Benefits
There has been considerable disagreement over whether and when to per-
mit third parties to enforce contracts that have been made for their benefit.
Both public international law and domestic contract law seek to distinguish
between third-party rights (which are enforceable) and mere third-party
benefits (which are not), though how to apply these tests in order to draw
this line is not always clear. In the case of investment treaties, the treaty
parties have accepted obligations with respect to investor protection without
specifying whether these create substantive rights for investors, home states,
or both.46 Without needing to resolve this question, what transforms these
obligations into enforceable third-party rights instead of mere benefits is
that the treaties expressly give investors the ability to enforce them through
investor-state arbitration.
The VCLT recognizes that a right may arise for a third State from a provi-
sion of a treaty “if the parties to the treaty intend the provision to accord that
right either to the third State, or to a group of States to which it belongs, or
to all States, and the third State assents thereto.”47 This rule applies to
rights created for third states, rather than for third parties that are non-state
actors, so it provides principles that would be applicable here by way of
44. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171
(granting substantive rights to individuals); Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17,
1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (imposing substantive obligations on individuals); European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, arts. 1–18, 34, Nov. 4, 1950, E.T.S. No. 5,
213 U.N.T.S. 221 (granting substantive rights to persons and permiting them to bring direct claims
against states).
45. VCLT, supra note 26, art. 31(1). R
46. Roberts, supra note 4 at 36–39. R
47. Id. art. 36 (emphasis added).
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analogy only. Unless the treaty provides otherwise, the third state is pre-
sumed to have assented to the right unless it indicates to the contrary.48
International law distinguishes between treaties that create rights, as op-
posed to mere benefits, for third states. For instance, where a treaty creates
mere benefits for a third state, the treaty parties may amend it at any time
because the third party has no enforceable rights in the matter. However,
where a treaty confers a right on a third state, the right of a third state “may
not be revoked or modified by the parties if it is established that the right
was intended not to be revocable or subject to modification without the con-
sent of the third State.”49
In both cases, the focus is on the intention of the treaty parties, which
accords with the approach that treats the relevant transaction as the inter-
state treaty and the relevant question as whether it was in the interests of the
treaty parties to create enforceable rights for third parties. The intentions
and actions of the third party may be relevant in so far as they provide
important context for informing the interests and intentions of the treaty
parties. However, the test of what rights and obligations have been given
depends on the intention of the treaty parties, not the intentions or legiti-
mate expectations of the third party.
Under domestic contract law, contracts are usually assumed to have legal
effects between the contracting parties only, but a general exception to priv-
ity is recognized for contractual rights that are granted to third-party bene-
ficiaries. As different legal systems adopt different approaches, I do not
outline the evolution with respect to third-party beneficiary rights that has
occurred in any single state.50 Instead, I draw on the UNIDROIT Principles
on International Commercial Contracts as a helpful distillation of common
contract law principles across a variety of national systems. According to the
UNIDROIT Principles:
(1) The parties (the “promisor” and the “promisee”) may confer
by express or implied agreement a right on a third party (the
“beneficiary”).
(2) The existence and content of the beneficiary’s right against
the promisor are determined by the agreement of the parties
and are subject to any conditions or other limitations under
the agreement.51
48. Id. art. 36.
49. Id. art. 37(2) (emphasis added).
50. For instance, in the United States, those discussing third-party-beneficiary rights would likely
cite to Lawrence v. Fox, 20 N.Y. 268 (N.Y. 1859) and Anthony Jon Waters, A Property in a Promise: A
Study of the Third Party Beneficiary Rule, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 1148 (1985), while in the United King-
dom, they would give prominence to Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999.
51. International Institute for the Unification of Private Law [UNIDROIT], UNIDROIT Principles
of International Commercial Contracts [hereinafter UNIDROIT Principles], art. 5.2.1 (emphasis
added).
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Again, the focus is on the agreement of the contracting parties, not on the
interests or expectations of the third party.
Domestic contract law typically draws a distinction between rights that
can be enforced by a third party and mere benefits that cannot be so en-
forced.52 In some cases, the contract parties may have an incentive to bestow
enforceable rights on a third party even if this later limits some of their
actions, either individually or collectively. For instance, contracting parties
may have an incentive to bestow enforceable rights on a third party if they
want that third party to act in reliance upon those rights. That is why,
unless the contract provides otherwise, the general rule adopted by the
UNIDROIT Principles is that the contracting parties “may modify or re-
voke the rights conferred by the contract on the beneficiary until the benefi-
ciary has accepted them or reasonably acted in reliance on them.”53
In determining when a third-party beneficiary should be permitted to
enforce a contract, Melvin Eisenberg suggests the following principle:
A third-party beneficiary should have power to enforce a contract
if, but only if:
(I) allowing the beneficiary to enforce the contract is a necessary
or important means of effectuating the contracting parties’ per-
formance objectives, as manifested in the contract read in the
light of surrounding circumstances; or
(II) allowing the beneficiary to enforce the contract is supported
by reasons of policy or morality independent of contract law and
would not conflict with the contracting parties’ performance
objectives.54
The first branch of the test reflects the concept that, at its core, contract
law seeks to facilitate the power of contracting parties to further their own
interests by contracting. Accordingly, under this branch:
[T]he purpose of allowing suit by a third party is not to ensure
that the third party realizes a benefit, but to ensure that the con-
tracting parties’ performance objectives are effectuated. Unlike
the intent-to-benefit test, which turns on whether the contracting
parties had an other-regarding intent to benefit the third party, the
first branch of the third-party-beneficiary principle turns on
whether allowing the third party to enforce the contract will fur-
ther the self-regarding interests of the contracting parties.55
52.  Commentary on the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts,
art. 5.2.1, at 585–86 (Stefan Vogenauer & Jan Kleinheisterkamp eds., 2009).
53. UNIDROIT Principles, art. 5.2.5.
54. Eisenberg, supra note 38, at 1385. R
55. Id. at 1386.
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This means that third-party-beneficiary rules should be conceived of as re-
medial rather than substantive. The question is not whether the contract
creates a substantive right for the third party, but whether empowering the
third party to enforce the contract is a necessary and important means of
effectuating the contracting parties’ performance objectives.
The second branch reflects the fact that contract law may give effect to
policy and normative concerns that are independent of the contracting par-
ties’ objectives. However, given the primacy of the contracting parties’ in-
tentions, a third party should not be permitted to enforce a contract under
this branch if doing so would conflict with the contracting parties’ objec-
tives. It is less clear whether this branch should cross apply in the interna-
tional law sphere given that no overarching sovereign exists to authorize the
pursuit of other goals over and above those agreed to by states. Nonetheless,
even if this prong were to apply, third parties should not be granted enforce-
able rights in a way that would be contrary to the joint interests of the
treaty parties.
Applying these doctrines by analogy, a strong argument can be made that
investment treaties should be understood as contracts between A and B (the
home and host state) that create enforceable rights for C (the class of inves-
tors from A and B investing in B and A respectively). As detailed below,
treaty parties have an interest in creating enforceable rights for foreign in-
vestors as a means to the end of achieving their own goal of promoting
foreign investment in order to increase state development. Investors are not
mere beneficiaries of investment treaties; rather, they are a specific, identifi-
able class of intended third-party beneficiaries with enforceable rights. To
understand what makes investment treaties unusual in this regard, it is in-
structive to draw a distinction between trade and investment treaties.
Investment treaties create benefits for investors like trade treaties create
benefits for traders. What distinguishes the two, however, is that invest-
ment treaties give investors a right to bring direct claims in order to enforce
these benefits. Investment treaties thus create enforceable third-party rights for
investors while trade law treaties create mere benefits for traders. The rationale
for this distinction may be linked to the heightened need to protect against
sovereign risks that are more acute for foreign investors operating within a
host state than for foreign traders operating without. It also explains why
second- and third-order controversies that pervade the investment treaty sys-
tem, such as settlement of claims, the permissibility of countermeasures, and
the effect of joint termination, are non-issues in trade law where the classic
state-to-state paradigm prevails.
As Eisenberg suggests, there is no need to go down the existing path of
focusing on the nature of investment treaty rights, i.e., whether these rights
are procedural and/or substantive. As he explains:
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[T]he law of third-party beneficiaries is largely conceived as reme-
dial, rather than substantive. The question . . . is not whether the
contract creates a “right” in the third party, but whether empow-
ering the third party to enforce the contract is a necessary or im-
portant means to effectuating the contracting parties’ performance
objectives.56
It is enough that investment treaties impose investment protection obliga-
tions on host states and give both investors and host states a chance to en-
force these obligations through investor-state and state-to-state arbitration
respectively. In order to achieve their goal of promoting foreign investment
to increase development, it may be in the interests of the treaty parties to
qualify some of the traditional doctrines relating to diplomatic protection,
treaty interpretation, and state responsibility.
b. Absolute, Conditional, or Limited Rights
Instead of focusing exclusively on the nature of investment treaty rights,
this third-party beneficiary approach encourages us to consider the extent and
limits of those rights.57 The question thus becomes whether these enforceable
third-party rights are absolute, conditional, or limited in nature. As the
contracting parties, the treaty parties have the power to define what rights
are given to investors and what powers are retained by the states. They could
choose to retain, dispense with, or impose conditions upon their individual
or collective sovereign powers but whether they have done so depends on
whether it was in their interests to do so.
To analyze what existing treaty parties have done, and what ideal treaty
parties would do, it is necessary to unpack what are often considered to be
the two main goals of investment treaties: (1) investor protection and (2) the
depoliticization of investor-state disputes. Tribunals and scholars often give
a skewed answer to these questions because they focus on the interests and
expectations of the investor, rather than the interests and intentions of the treaty
parties. It is also necessary to disaggregate between the three investor-state
relationships that define the investment treaty system, namely investors’ re-
lationships with the host state, the home state, and the treaty parties acting
collectively, as the treaty parties may have an interest in striking a different
balance with respect to each.
Before unpacking these goals and disaggregating these relationships,
however, it is important to qualify this hybrid approach by drawing on pub-
lic law principles given that third-party-beneficiary doctrines typically regu-
late relations between juridical equals (i.e., between states or between
56. Eisenberg, supra note 38, at 1386. R
57. Cf. Junianto James Losari and Michael Ewing-Chow, A Clash of Treaties: The Lawfulness of Counter-
measures in International Trade Law and International Investment Law, 16 J. World Trade & Investment
270, 291–97 (Soc’y of Int’l Econ. Law, Working Paper No. 2014/18, 2015) (arguing against conflating
the issues of the nature of investment treaty rights and the components of those rights).
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private parties), whereas investment treaties are entered into by sovereign
states but create enforceable rights for non-state actors (i.e., investors).
C. A Public Law Qualification
Public international law and domestic contract law both structure private
law relations between actors that exist on a horizontal plane of equality, i.e.,
relations between states under public international law or relations between
non-state actors under contract law. Even though public international law is
public in the sense that it deals with states, it is fundamentally private in
nature when it deals with the rights and obligations of states vis-a`-vis each
other, which is why many of the field’s analogies are drawn from private
law.58
Investment treaties are not private in this sense because they concern hor-
izontal relations between states as equals and vertical relations between those
states and investors as non-state actors.59 The fact that the tripartite struc-
ture involves a contract between two sovereigns that bestows enforceable
rights on non-sovereign actors suggests that public law notions might be
useful in qualifying the cross-application of private law contracting princi-
ples to the investment sphere. The need for such qualifications is best illus-
trated by considering the limits of contract law analogies being used in the
context of third-party obligations as opposed to third-party rights.
As a matter of contract law, the promisee and promisor cannot impose an
obligation on a third party without the third party’s consent because they all
exist in a horizontal plane of equality. This represents a classic private law
understanding of legal relationships. Yet states can enter into treaties im-
posing obligations on individuals subject to their jurisdiction without those
individuals needing to consent. Examples include treaties dealing with in-
ternational criminal law or taxation. Treaty parties can do this because the
relationship between states and individuals is vertical rather than horizontal
as it exists between those that govern (the treaty parties) and those that are
governed (individuals subject to the jurisdiction of those states). This repre-
sents a classic public law understanding of legal relationships.
Investment treaties involve three public law relationships. The literature
has already clearly recognized the need to analyze the investor-host state rela-
tionship through a public law paradigm (first-order relationship).60 I con-
tend that we also need to recognize that investors and their home states have
58. See, e.g., Hersch Lauterpacht, Private Law Sources and Analogies of International
Law (1927).
59. Roberts, supra note 22, at 63–64. R
60. Gus Van Harten, Investment Treaty Arbitration and Public Law (2007); Stephan W.
Schill, International Investment Law and Comparative Public Law—An Introduction, in International In-
vestment Law And Comparative Public Law 3 (Stephan W. Schill ed. 2010); Santiago Montt,
State Liability in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Global Constitutional and Administra-
tive Law in the Bit Generation (2009).
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a public law relationship that is governed by international rules on diplo-
matic protection and the home state’s domestic law (second-order relation-
ship). In addition, I argue that the vertical nature of the relationship
between the treaty parties (as sovereigns) and investors (as non-sovereign)
means that the treaty parties can be viewed as a joint sovereign that created
the investment treaty and thus presumptively retains certain powers to re-
voke or amend that treaty (third-order relationship).
The public law relationships between investors and their home states, and
between investors and the treaty parties acting jointly, have the potential to
qualify the third-party-beneficiary paradigm in important ways. For in-
stance, it may provide useful qualifications to the notion of when and how
ideal treaty parties would likely intend third-party rights to vest, given that
non-state actors are not usually able to lock in favorable laws simply by
accepting or relying upon those laws in the way that they often can with
respect to private law contracts. It might also suggest some limits on the
joint power of the treaty parties recognized under traditional public interna-
tional law models, akin to domestic rules against laws with retroactive effect
or expropriations without compensation. These possibilities are considered
in more detail below.
III. Unpacking the Goal of Investor Protection
To understand the extent and limits of investment treaty rights, we first
need to better understand what is often taken to be the treaty parties’ sub-
stantive goal in entering into such agreements: investor protection. There is
a tendency within the case law and literature to treat investor protection as:
(a) both an end in and of itself, rather than as a means to an end, and as an
absolute goal rather than a qualified one; and (b) a uniform concept that can
be applied to settle controversies in relations between investors and states in
general, without disaggregating how it might apply differently to the three
types of investor-state relationships involved in investment treaties. I disa-
gree with both approaches.
When assessed from the perspective of ideal treaty parties, investment
protection should be understood as a means to the end of promoting foreign
investments in order to increase development, rather than as an end in and
of itself. This goal is also not absolute as real treaty parties have, and ideal
treaty parties would, seek to balance their interest in promoting foreign
investment against their interest in protecting their sovereignty to enable
them to pursue other welfare goals, such as protection of health and safety
and wealth redistribution through taxation. The balance ideal treaty parties
would be likely to strike between investment protection and the preserva-
tion of sovereign prerogatives is likely to differ among the three investor-
state relationships identified.
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLI\56-2\HLI201.txt unknown Seq: 24 21-AUG-15 12:02
376 Harvard International Law Journal / Vol. 56
A. Rethinking the Substantive Goal of Investment Treaties
Protecting State Sovereignty
Promoting InvestmentsInvestor Protection
1. Investment Protection as a Means to an End
Investment protection should be understood as a means to the end of
promoting efficient investments and thereby increasing net economic gains
of home and host states. It is not an end in and of itself. As Anne van Aaken
explains:
It is not only questionable whether the (only) purpose of IIAs is
the protection of investment, but also whether it is actually a pur-
pose at all. As most preambles reveal, the protection and promo-
tion of investment is the means to an end, the end being the
maximization of welfare, development, or prosperity of the home
and host states.61
For home states, an increase in efficient foreign investments will not just
benefit their investing nationals; it is also likely to benefit their non-invest-
ing nationals because the state’s development is likely to be enhanced
through increased tax revenues. For host states, promoting such investments
means increasing development through the creation of new jobs, the devel-
opment of new infrastructure, and the enhancement of tax revenues.
To understand why investment protection and increased foreign invest-
ment are not goals in and of themselves, consider a situation in which iden-
tical investors from the United States and Canada could equally invest in
either state. If the investors invest in their homes states, they would receive
no investment protection. If the U.S. investor invested in Canada and the
Canadian investor invested in the United States, they would receive invest-
ment protection. If the goal of investment treaties were to protect investors
per se, or simply to increase foreign investment, the second scenario would
look like a win-win. However, there has been no net economic gain in the
61. Anne van Aaken, Interpretational Methods as an Instrument of Control in International Invest-
ment Law, 108 ASIL Proceedings (2014 forthcoming); see also Anne van Aaken & Tobias Lehmann,
Sustainable Development and International Investment Law: An Harmonious View from Economics, in Interna-
tional Investment Law and Policy 317, 329, 332 (Roberto Echandi and Pierre Sauve´ eds., 2013)
(“the object of the treaty may be investor protection, while the underlying purpose is (sustainable) devel-
opment;” “The purpose of [investment treaties] must be seen as contributing to the welfare or prosperity
of home and host states by means of investment protection and promotion.”).
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second scenario, so there is little reason to believe that treaty parties would
have an interest in protecting and promoting such investments.62
Instead, from the perspective of ideal treaty parties, investment protection
should be understood as a means to the end of promoting efficient foreign
investments in order to maximize net economic gains for the home and host
state. This idea of investment protection being a means to an end of promot-
ing economic development and efficient allocations of economic resources is
clear in the preambles of many older- and newer-style investment treaties
and Model BITs.63 Investment treaties may achieve this by protecting
against hold-up costs, sometimes referred to as the “obsolescing bargain” or
“dynamic inconsistency” problem. Two examples serve to illustrate the
problem.
One concern motivating investment treaties is that it would be efficient
for Investor A to invest in State B because of the potential for higher re-
turns, but that Investor A chooses not to do so because it is concerned about
increased sovereign risks in State B. For instance, Investor A might be con-
cerned that after it sinks the money into building its investment, State B
might expropriate its investment without paying compensation. This might
result in Investor A choosing to invest in State A even though this produces
a lower overall surplus. Provisions that protect against expropriation with-
out compensation seek to protect against this concern.
Another concern motivating investment treaties is to protect against une-
qual treatment of domestic and foreign investors. If states provide advan-
tages to national investors over foreign investors, or to some foreign
investors over other foreign investors, this may produce inefficiencies within
the market. Provisions that require host states to provide equal treatment to
foreign and domestic investors (national treatment) and between foreign in-
vestors (most favored nations treatment) seek to eliminate these differences
in order to allow firms to compete on an equal footing.
The main focus of investment treaties has been on protecting against inef-
ficient underinvestment as a result of these sorts of sovereign risks, i.e., situ-
ations in which it would be efficient for Investor A to invest in State B but
Investor A fails to do so due to concerns about certain sovereign risks. How-
ever, providing too much protection might lead to inefficient overinvest-
ment. In deciding whether to invest, investors must weigh many risks,
62. Bonnitcha, supra note 14, at 102. R
63. See, e.g., 1984 U.S. Model BIT, supra note 9, preamble (“Desiring to promote greater economic
cooperation between them, particularly with respect to investment by nationals and companies of one
Party in the territory of the other Party; and Recognizing that agreement upon the treatment to be
accorded such investment will stimulate the flow of private capital and the economic development of the
Parties, Agreeing that fair and equitable treatment of investment is desirable in order to maintain a
stable framework for investment and maximum effective utilization of economic resources”); 2012 U.S.
Model BIT, supra note 21, preamble (“Desiring to promote greater economic cooperation between them
with respect to investment by nationals and enterprises of one Party in the territory of the other Party;
Recognizing that agreement on the treatment to be accorded such investment will stimulate the flow of
private capital and the economic development of the Parties”).
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including the likely availability of natural resources, market stability, cur-
rency changes, and reasonable or efficient regulatory changes. Investment
treaties are meant to protect against one type of risk—unreasonable or inef-
ficient sovereign actions such as expropriation without compensation or dis-
crimination—rather than providing an insurance policy against all risks.
Protecting foreign investors or promoting foreign investments per se
would lead to the risk of overinvestment, which may be just as problematic
as the risk of underinvestment. In particular, it might undermine attempts
to achieve efficient investments by creating the risk of moral hazard with
respect to reasonable and efficient regulatory actions. If an investor knew
that it would be protected against any future regulatory changes, even ones
that were efficiency enhancing in terms of producing an increase in net eco-
nomic benefits, this might produce a moral hazard that would encourage the
investor to overinvest because doing so would be efficient as judged from the
perspective of the investor even though it would be inefficient as judged
from the overall perspective of the treaty parties.64
Consider a situation in which an investor of State A (Investor A) decides
to invest in State B by building a factory that produces a profit of $100 per
year but at the cost of pumping out harmful chemicals into State B’s air that
would cost $200 to remove. From an overall perspective, this would be an
inefficient investment because the gains from the investment are lower than
the costs. Yet, if Investor A could invest with knowledge that it was not
currently required to pay for the costs of such pollution, and State B could
not change its environmental regulations to make Investor A pay for the
costs of such pollution without having to compensate Investor A, then it
would be likely to invest because doing so would be efficient from the per-
spective of Investor A.
If, on the other hand, Investor A knew that it would be liable to pay the
costs of efficiency-enhancing general regulations, then it would have to de-
cide whether it was worth investing given the risk that, if State B changed
its environmental regulations, State B would not have to compensate Inves-
tor A for any losses the investor incurred as a result. In such a case, Investor
A might choose either not to invest or to invest but install newer filters at a
cost of $50 in order to prevent the pollution occurring in the first place.
Both options would be preferable to providing absolute investment protec-
tion and thus incentivizing inefficient overinvestment.65
2. Promotion of Foreign Investments as a Qualified Goal
Sovereign states are not pure profit maximizing entities. Instead, their
over-arching goal is better understood as maximizing the welfare of their
nationals. States must weigh their interest in increasing foreign investments
64. Bonnitcha, supra note 14 at 72–75. R
65. Id.
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in order to maximize their net economic gains against their interest in pur-
suing other welfare goals, such as protecting health and safety, redistrib-
uting wealth through taxation, and protecting their essential security
interests. Where some of these concerns can be reduced to a monetary value,
they can be included in the above analysis, but others involve an apples-to-
oranges comparison that is open to different policy trade-offs.66 For instance,
how should states weigh the economic gains from permitting cigarettes to
be sold or nuclear energy to be produced against the risks to human health
from both activities?
For this reason, ideal treaty parties would be likely to treat promoting
foreign investments as a qualified, rather than absolute, goal. This approach
is consistent with interpretive statements adopted in recent investment trea-
ties and Model BITs which provide, for instance, that non-discriminatory
regulatory actions by a treaty party that are designed and applied to protect
legitimate public welfare objectives, such as public health, safety, and the
environment, do not constitute indirect expropriations.67 Some of these in-
terpretations are subject to an exception in “rare circumstances,” but they
differ on what constitutes rare circumstances.68 It is also consistent with
increasing references in preambles to the need to protect foreign investment
without compromising other important goals such as the protection of
health, safety, and the environment.69
The fact that ideal treaty parties would treat investment protection as a
qualified, rather than absolute, goal should come as no surprise. On a do-
mestic level, no state protects investments to the exclusion of all other inter-
ests. One should not expect the outcome to be different at the international
level. Moreover, in addition to being qualified, the goal of promoting for-
eign investments is likely to be inversely proportional to the treaty parties’
66. Some others who have taken an economics approach to investment treaties similarly separate out
these economic and non-economic goals. See, e.g., Bonnitcha, supra note 14, at 54–57, 62–65. R
67. See, e.g., 2009 ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement, Feb. 26 2009, Annex 2; New
Zealand-China Free Trade Agreement, China-N.Z., Apr. 7, 2008, Annex 13 [hereinafter New Zealand-
China FTA], available at http://www.chinafta.govt.nz/1-The-agreement/2-Text-of-the-agreement/in-
dex.php; 2012 U.S. Model BIT, supra note 21, Annex B; 2004 Canada Model Agreement for the Promo-
tion and Protection of Investments, Annex B, available at http://italaw.com/documents/Canadian2004-
FIPA-model-en.pdf [hereinafter 2004 Canadian Model BIT].
68. See, e.g., New Zealand-China FTA, supra note 67, Annex 13 (“Except in rare circumstances” such
as a deprivation of property that is “discriminatory in its effect” or “in breach of the state’s prior binding
written commitment to the investor”); 2012 U.S. Model BIT, supra note 21, Annex B (“Except in rare
circumstances . . .” with no further explanation given); 2004 Canadian Model BIT, supra note 67, Annex
B (“Except in rare circumstances, such as when a measure or series of measures are so severe in the light
of their purpose that they cannot be reasonably viewed as having been adopted and applied in good
faith”).
69. See, e.g., 2012 U.S. Model BIT, supra note 21, preamble (“Agreeing that a stable framework for
investment will maximize effective utilization of economic resources and improve living standards; Rec-
ognizing the importance of providing effective means of asserting claims and enforcing rights with re-
spect to investment under national law as well as through international arbitration; Desiring to achieve
these objectives in a manner consistent with the protection of health, safety, and the environment, and
the promotion of internationally recognized labor rights”).
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goal of protecting their sovereign ability to pursue other welfare goals. In
simplified terms, the broader the protections granted to foreign investors,
the narrower the sovereignty powers retained by states to pursue other wel-
fare goals and vice versa.
If states are given complete freedom to act, the investment treaty system
will not provide sufficient assurances to investors to promote efficient in-
vestments. If investors are given absolute protection, this will exceed what is
required to promote efficient investment and it would preclude the balanc-
ing of investment promotion against other welfare goals. In turn, the oner-
ous nature of these obligations will create incentives for states to exit the
investment treaty system and to fail to enter into new investment treaties,
thereby undermining investor protection and the promotion of efficient in-
vestments in the long term.
Investment tribunals are increasingly recognizing that the goals of invest-
ment protection and promotion are important but not absolute. For in-
stance, in El Paso v. Argentina, the Tribunal held that “a balanced
interpretation is needed, taking into account State sovereignty and the State’s
responsibility to create an adapted and evolutionary framework for the de-
velopment of economic activities, and the necessity to protect foreign invest-
ment and its continuing flow.”70 Likewise, the Tribunal in Saluka v. Czech
Republic held that:
The protection of foreign investments is not the sole aim of the
Treaty, but rather a necessary element alongside the overall aim of
encouraging foreign investment and extending and intensifying
the parties’ economic relations. That in turn calls for a balanced
approach to the interpretation of the Treaty’s substantive provi-
sions for the protection of investments, since an interpretation
which exaggerates the protection to be accorded to foreign invest-
ments may serve to dissuade host States from admitting foreign
investments and so undermine the overall aim of extending and
intensifying the parties’ mutual economic relations.71
Ideal treaty parties would have an incentive to adopt interior solutions
that fall between the extremes of total investment protection and complete
preservation of state sovereignty. No single formula exists for determining
the precise balance that should be struck between these goals. Again, this
should not be surprising. In domestic systems, the balance between the gov-
ernance needs of states and the property rights or reliance interests of indi-
viduals remains contested, as can be seen in ongoing debates about
distinguishing regulatory takings from non-compensable regulation, when
70. El Paso Energy Int’l Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15, Decision on Juris-
diction, ¶70 (Apr. 27, 2006) (emphasis added).
71. Saluka Investments B.V. (Neth.) v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Partial Award, ¶ 300 (Mar. 17,
2006) (emphasis added).
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to apply the presumption against retroactivity, how to deal with changes in
regulations that impact upon government contracts, and what counts as a
vested right.72 This same ongoing contestation also plays out in the invest-
ment treaty field.
B. Calibrating the Balance in Three Investor-State Relationships
Treaty Parties
Home StateHost State
To understand how the inherent tension between investor protection and
promotion, on the one hand, and the preservation of state sovereignty, on
the other hand, plays out, we must disaggregate between three investor-state
relationships, because existing treaty parties have adopted, and ideal treaty
parties would be likely to adopt, a different balance with respect to each one.
1. First-Order Tension
The first-order tension between investor protection and state sovereignty
concerns the relationship between investors and host states acting unilaterally.
Unlike the second- and third-order relationships, this relationship tends to
be expressly addressed by investment treaties.
On a substantive level, host states accept certain obligations to protect
foreign investments and investors as a means to the end of promoting for-
eign investment. For instance, host states typically agree (1) to accord to
foreign investors no less favorable treatment than that they accord, in like
circumstances, to their own investors (national treatment); (2) to accord to
foreign investors covered by the treaty treatment no less favorable than that
they accord, in like circumstances, to investors of other states (most favored
nation treatment); (3) to accord foreign investors fair and equitable treat-
ment and full protection and security; and (4) not to expropriate a covered
investment except for a public purpose, in a non-discriminatory manner, and
on payment of prompt, adequate, and effective compensation.
However, these substantive obligations are not absolute. Instead, invest-
ment treaties frequently contain clarifications and exceptions designed to
72. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Property: Principles and Policies (2d ed.
2012) (Chapter 11 deals with “Government Forbearance,” which seeks to balance the government’s
sovereign interest in accommodating change and the interest of protecting the reliance interests of pri-
vate parties, which plays out in various doctrines including government contracting, due process, vested
rights, the presumption against retroactive laws, and investment treaties).
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protect a meaningful degree of state sovereignty in the form of regulatory
autonomy. For instance, some treaties include interpretive annexes provid-
ing that non-discriminatory regulatory actions that are designed and applied
to protect legitimate public welfare objectives, such as public health, safety,
and the environment, do not constitute indirect expropriations, either ever
or only in rare circumstances.73 Many treaties include exceptions clauses that
exempt from liability actions taken in order to maintain or restore interna-
tional peace and security or to protect a state’s essential security interests.74
Some provide exceptions for environmental protection and health and safety
measures.75
On a procedural level, most investment treaties grant investors the ability
to bring investor-state claims against the host state to enforce these substan-
tive obligations. Investment treaties often include this measure to ensure
that an impartial tribunal exists to enforce the treaty obligations given that
not all host states have effective and impartial domestic courts that are capa-
ble of policing their own government’s actions. In addition, investor-state
arbitration was added to the traditional international law remedy of state-to-
state arbitration as a way of depoliticizing investment treaty disputes, a goal
that is considered in more detail below. These investment tribunals are em-
powered to interpret and apply investment treaties, including by filling
gaps and resolving ambiguities in appropriate cases.
73. See, e.g., 2012 U.S. Model BIT, supra note 21, arts. 12, 13, Annex B; United States of America and
the Oriental Republic of Uruguay Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Invest-
ment, Annex B, U.S.-Uru., Nov. 4, 2005, available at http://www.ustr.gov/sites/ default/files/uploads/
agreements/bit/asset_upload_file748_9005.pdf; United States-Australia Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-
Aust., Annex 11-B, May 18, 2004, 118 Stat. 919, available at www.dfat.gov.au/trade/negotiations/
us.html [hereinafter Australia-U.S. FTA]; 2004 Canadian Model BIT, supra note 67, Annex B.13(1).
74. See, e.g., 2012 U.S. Model BIT, supra note 21, art. 18; 2004 Canadian Model BIT, supra note 67,
art. 10(4); Colombian Model Bilateral Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, art.
II(3), 2007, available at http://italaw.com/documents/inv_model_bit_colombia.pdf [hereinafter 2007 Co-
lombian Model BIT]; Indian Model Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, art.
12(2), 2003, available at http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/archive/ita1026.pdf [hereinafter 2003
Indian Model BIT]; Japan-Singapore New-Age Economic Partnership Agreement, Japan-Sing., art. 4,
Jan. 13, 2002 [hereinafter Japan-Singapore BIT], available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/
singapore/jsepa-1.pdf; Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement Between the Republic of India
and the Republic of Singapore, India-Sing., art. 10.01(2), June 5, 2005, available at http://www.com
merce.nic.in/trade/international_ta_framework_ceca.asp [hereinafter India-Singapore BIT]; New Zea-
land-China FTA, supra note 67, art. 201(1).
75. See, e.g., Japan-Malaysia Economic Partnership Agreement, Japan-Malay., art. 10, Dec. 13, 2005,
available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/malaysia/epa/content.pdf; India-Singapore BIT, supra
note 74, art. 54; Korea-Singapore Free Trade Agreement, Sing-S. Kor., arts. 10.7(4), 10.12, 10.18, 2005,
[hereinafter Korea-Singapore FTA] available at http://www.worldtradelaw.net/fta/agreements/korsingfta
.pdf; 2004 Canadian Model BIT, supra note 67, art. 10; Panama-Taiwan Free Trade Agreement, Pan.-
Taiwan, art. 20.02, Aug. 21, 2003 [hereinafter Panama-Taiwan FTA], available at http://www.sice.oas
.org/trade/panrc/pan_twn_full_text_e.pdf; New Zealand-China FTA, supra note 67, art. 200(2); Japan-
Singapore BIT, supra note 74, art. 83.
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2. Second-Order Tension
The second-order tension between investor protection and state sover-
eignty concerns the relationship between investors and home states acting indi-
vidually. While investment treaties expressly protect foreign investors from
certain unilateral actions by host states, most do not expressly protect for-
eign investors from unilateral actions by their home states.
On a substantive level, investment treaties typically do not impose obli-
gations on home states. Obligations with respect to national treatment,
most-favored-nations treatment, and expropriation are imposed on both
treaty parties but with respect to investors and investments coming from the
other treaty party. This means that they are imposed on both treaty parties
acting in their capacities as host states, not as home states.
On a procedural level, investment treaties permit an investor from one
state to bring an arbitral claim against the other state, i.e., the host state;
they do not permit investors to sue their own home state. In this way, the
substantive obligations and procedural rights created by investment treaties
seem to be primarily geared towards the first-order relationship, not the
second-order one.
Despite this, many lawyers and commentators seek to imply limitations
on the home state’s actions on the basis that (1) the purpose of investment
treaties is to protect investors and investment and/or (2) the treaty parties
agreed to accept investor-state arbitration in order to “depoliticize” invest-
ment disputes and to remove them from the state-to-state realm. These is-
sues are implicated in the first two controversies listed in the introduction.
First, if investors are given a right to bring arbitral claims against host
states, is this right immunized from interference by the home state? For
example, could the home state agree to settle its investor’s claim without the
investor’s consent? Could the home state pre-empt existing or future inves-
tor-state claims by filing its own state-to-state claim covering the same un-
derlying conduct? Or does the investor have a right to bring an investor-
state claim that is immunized from interference by its home state? Does it
depend on whether the treaty has a clause, like Article 27 in the Convention
on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of
Other States (“ICSID Convention”),76 which provides that a home state can
no longer provide diplomatic protection after an investor-state claim has
been brought? If so, does one rule exist before an investor-state claim is filed
and another exist afterwards?
76. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other
States (ICSID Convention), art. 27(1), Mar. 18, 1965, 575 UNTS 159 [hereinafter Claims Settlement
Declaration].
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Consider a situation like the Iran-U.S. hostage crisis.77 This diplomatic
crisis erupted when a group of Iranian students took over the U.S. Embassy
in Tehran, resulting in fifty-two U.S. diplomats and citizens being held
hostage for 444 days in 1979–81. Tensions increased as negotiations did not
bear fruit and a 1980 U.S. rescue mission failed, resulting in the deaths of
eight U.S. servicemen, one Iranian civilian, and the destruction of two air-
craft. On January 20, 1981, the U.S. hostages were released by Iran pursuant
to an agreement between the United States and Iran reached through the aid
of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria as an intermediary.78
Under the Agreement, the United States was obligated:
[T]o terminate all legal proceedings in United States courts in-
volving claims of United States persons and institutions against
Iran and its state enterprises, to nullify all attachments and judg-
ments obtained therein, to prohibit all further litigation based on
such claims, and to bring about the termination of such claims
through binding arbitration.79
The Agreement also called for the establishment of an Iran-U.S. Claims Tri-
bunal, which would arbitrate any claims not settled within six months, re-
sulting in final, binding, and enforceable awards.80
Thus, as part of an agreement to resolve the hostage crisis, Iran and the
United States created the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal and agreed that this
body should resolve all claims by U.S. nationals against Iran, and Iranian
nationals against the United States. An essential prerequisite for this step
was that each state agreed to nullify all domestic claims that had been or
might be brought by its nationals against the other state.81 Would the
United States and Iran have had the power to do this if an investment treaty
had existed between them giving investors the right to bring investor-state
claims? Are such claims effectively immunized from interference by the
home state in order to protect investment or depoliticize investment dis-
putes? Does it depend on whether claims had already been filed?
Second, are investors given rights that are immunized from the inter-state
relationship between the home and host state? For instance, if an investor
brings an arbitral claim against the host state, could the host state claim as a
77. For general background information, see Iran-U.S. Hostage Crisis (1979-1981), The History
Guy, http://www.historyguy.com/iran-us_hostage_crisis.html#.VNUpwloirzI and Iran Hostage Crisis,
Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iran_hostage_crisis#cite_note-1.
78. See Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria (General
Declaration), U.S.-Iran, Jan. 19, 1981, reprinted in 1 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 3 (1983).
79. Id. at 3.
80. Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria Concerning
the Settlement of Claims by the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the
Islamic Republic of Iran (Claims Settlement Declaration), U.S.-Iran, Jan. 19, 1981, arts. I, II, in 1 Iran-
U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 9 (1983).
81. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981) (holding that the President has the power to
suspend and terminate claims of American nationals against Iran).
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defense that its actions violated the investment treaty but were excused as a
lawful countermeasure in response to a previous violation by the investor’s
home state? Are the rights granted to investors independent of the state-to-
state relationship? Or are any rights granted to investors dependent on, and
subject to, the ongoing state-to-state relationship? Would it make any dif-
ference whether the previous violation was of the investment treaty or of
another international law obligation? Would the countermeasure have to
have been previously brought before or ruled upon by a state-to-state
tribunal?
These issues recently came to the fore in a series of investor-state claims
brought by U.S. investors against Mexico under the investment chapter of
North American Free Trade Agreement (“NAFTA”).82 NAFTA is a free
trade agreement between Canada, Mexico, and the United States that in-
cludes trade and investment obligations. It also includes a procedure for
state-to-state arbitration over trade disputes (Chapter 20) and investor-state
arbitration over investment disputes (Chapter 11). The countermeasures
question arose in the context of a series of disputes relating to U.S. treat-
ment of Mexican sugar producers and Mexico’s treatment of U.S. High
Fructose Corn Syrup (HFCS) producers.83
Sugar and HFCS are both sweeteners that are used in food and drinks,
including soft drinks, so they are in a competitive relationship. U.S. produc-
ers of HFCS began expanding into Mexico where they were attempting to
displace sugar as the primary sweetener in the Mexican soft drink industry.
At the same time, Mexican sugar producers were complaining that the
United States was denying them access to the U.S. sugar market in violation
of its trade obligations under NAFTA. In an effort to resolve the latter dis-
pute, Mexico attempted to bring a state-to-state claim against the United
States under Chapter 20 of NAFTA, but the United States refused to consti-
tute a panel so the dispute went nowhere.
Mexico subsequently imposed a tax of twenty percent on any drink that
used HFCS as a sweetener. Three U.S. producers of HFCS responded by
filing investor-state claims against Mexico. They argued that the tax
amounted to a violation of Mexico’s NAFTA investment obligations because
it caused the Mexican soft drink industry to switch from HFCS to sugar,
thereby destroying their market share. Mexico responded that, if these ac-
tions amounted to a violation of its treaty obligations, the wrongfulness of
this action was precluded on the basis that the tax was a lawful countermea-
sure in response to a previous violation by the United States.
82. North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., art. 2202, Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289
(1993) [hereinafter NAFTA].
83. See Archer Daniels Midland Co. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/04/05,
Award (Nov. 21, 2007); Corn Products Int’l, Inc. v. Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/04/01, Decision
on Responsibility (Jan. 15, 2008); Cargill, Inc. v. Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/05/2, Award (Sept.
18, 2009).
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Mexico argued that the U.S. investors were merely given a procedural
right to enforce the substantive investment treaty obligations that were
owed to its home state, the United States. As the substantive obligations
were owed on an inter-state level, any breach was also subject to any inter-
state defenses, such as lawful countermeasures. The U.S. investors, by con-
trast, argued that NAFTA created substantive and procedural rights for the
investors and depoliticized investment disputes by immunizing them from
the home and host state relationship. The U.S. investors were not guilty of
previous wrongdoing and their claim should not be compromised based on
previous wrongdoing by their home state.
Both controversies require us to conceptualize the relationship between
investors and their home states. The first concerns whether investors are
directly protected against actions by their home states, such as the home state
deciding to bring or settle a claim without the investor’s consent. The sec-
ond concerns whether they are indirectly protected against actions of their
home state, such as a home state’s previous treaty violation that might be
invoked by a host state as a defense in an investor-state dispute.
3. Third-Order Tension
The third-order tension between investor protection and state sovereignty
concerns the relationship between investors and the treaty parties acting collec-
tively. As with the second-order tension, investment treaties typically do not
expressly protect investors from joint actions of the treaty parties as opposed
to unilateral actions of host states.
On a substantive level, investment treaties typically do not impose obli-
gations on the treaty parties collectively; instead, they generally impose ob-
ligations on each treaty party acting individually as a host state. On a
procedural level, investment treaties permit investors to bring claims against
host states but do not create a framework for investors to bring arbitral
claims against both treaty parties for joint actions.
Investment treaties may not allow investors to bring claims against the
treaty parties collectively, but do the rights granted to investors immunize
them against the joint actions of the treaty parties in any way? Is this re-
quired by (1) the substantive goal of investor protection or (2) the procedu-
ral goal of depoliticized investment disputes? These questions arise in the
third controversy raised above concerning joint termination with immediate
effect.
As a matter of public international law, the VCLT provides that treaty
parties can terminate a treaty in conformity with the provisions of the treaty
or at any time by consent of all of the treaty parties.84 To provide stability
for investors, some of which make long-term investments, most investment
treaties include a “survival clause” whereby the treaty’s protections continue
84. VCLT, supra note 26, art. 54. R
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to apply to existing investors and existing investments for ten to twenty
years after either treaty party terminates. This clearly applies in the event of
unilateral termination, but most investment treaties say nothing about what
happens if the treaty parties jointly terminate the investment treaty.
Under the first prong of the public international law rule, termination
might be permissible but is subject to the survival clause on the theory that
joint termination is the equivalent of two unilateral terminations. Under the
second prong, however, states would be able to agree to terminate immedi-
ately at any time, thereby circumventing the survival clause. Could the
treaty parties use this power to jointly terminate investment treaties with
immediate, or even retroactive, effect? Or do investors enjoy some immunity
from joint terminations on the basis that investment treaties were intended
to protect investments and depoliticize investment disputes? Does this de-
pend on whether the rights might be understood to have vested by, for
instance, an investment having been made, an investor-state dispute having
arisen, or an investor-state claim having been filed?
This issue recently arose when the Czech Republic agreed with some
treaty parties to jointly terminate their investment treaties with immediate
effect and to amend the survival clauses to ensure that they “shall not fur-
ther apply.”85 The European Commission has encouraged other EU states to
follow suit with respect to intra-EU BITs.86 Numerous states have also
jointly terminated their investment treaties, and abolished or modified sur-
vival clauses, when entering into new free trade agreements with investment
chapters.87 Do the treaty parties retain the power to do this? Or have the
treaty parties granted investors rights that are somehow immunized from
this sort of joint action, at least with respect to rights that might be consid-
ered to have vested?
While investment treaties expressly deal with the first-order tension be-
tween investment protection and promotion and preservation of state sover-
eignty, they typically contain no rules dealing expressly with the second-
and third-order tensions.
Treaty parties could expressly provide for a balance between investment
protection and state sovereignty in their first-order relationship but for com-
plete sovereignty in their second and third-order relationships. For instance,
the treaty parties could provide that the home state is able to preempt its
investors’ claims, even after a claim has been filed. Or they could provide
85. Luke Eric Peterson, Czech Republic Terminates Investment Treaties in Such a Way as to Cast Doubt on
Residual Legal Protection for Existing Investments, 4 Investment Arb. Rep. 2 (Feb. 1, 2011).
86. See Regulation (EU) No. 1219/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 Decem-
ber 2012 Establishing Transitional Arrangements for Bilateral Investment Agreements Between Member
States and Third Countries, 2012 O.J. (L 351/40) preambular recital 5, art. 3 [hereinafter Transitional
Arrangements for Bilateral Investment].
87. For examples, see Tania Voon, Andrew Mitchell & James Munro, Parting Ways: The Impact of
Investor Rights on Mutual Termination of Investment Treaties, 29 ICSID Rev–Foreign Inv. L. J. 451, nn.1–4
(2014).
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that the treaty parties are able to jointly terminate the treaty with immedi-
ate effect, even when doing so would harm existing investors. Treaty parties
might do this if they consider the real ill that investment treaties are seek-
ing to remedy as being the abuse of sovereign rights by host states, such as
hold-up costs, rather than any unilateral actions by home states or joint
actions by the treaty parties.
Making these powers express would be helpful in protecting against reli-
ance interests. Investors acting with knowledge of such provisions would be
able to internalize this risk into their decision-making on whether, how, and
at what price to invest. Investors would know that they would have no legal
basis for seeking stability of their investment treaty rights against unilateral
actions by their home states and joint actions by the treaty parties, even if
they had relied upon those rights in making an investment or bringing a
claim. Dealing with these issues expressly also minimizes the potential for
divergence between the intentions of the treaty parties (as the treaty’s draft-
ers) and the interpretations of tribunals (as the treaty’s enforcers).
Alternatively, the treaty parties could expressly dispense with or limit
their unilateral powers as home states and their joint powers as treaty par-
ties. They could provide that home states cannot usurp their investors’
claims after the claims have been filed or that they can do so only in limited
circumstances, such as when intervention is necessary to protect their essen-
tial security interests. They could provide that both unilateral and joint ter-
minations are subject to a survival clause and that certain provisions, such as
the survival clause, are unamendable. As with constitutional amendments,
to ensure this outcome the treaty parties would also need to provide that the
provision that lists these clauses as unamendable was itself listed as
unamendable.
The difficulty comes with how to interpret investment treaties that do
not expressly regulate second and third-order investor-state relationships.
Did the treaty parties intend to maintain absolute state sovereignty in this
regard? Or should some limits be implied in order to give effect to the
intentions of the treaty parties or for some other reasons of policy or moral-
ity? The substantive goal of investor protection seems primarily, if not ex-
clusively, aimed at regulating the first-order relationship between investors
and host states. Accordingly, to answer these questions, it is necessary to
consider whether the treaty parties intended to accept certain limitations on
their freedom in order to give effect to the purpose of depoliticizing invest-
ment disputes.
IV. Unpacking the Goal of Depoliticization
Did investment treaty parties intend to limit their sovereign rights under
the second and third-order relationships by accepting investor-state arbitra-
tion with the purpose of depoliticizing investment disputes? I contend that
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the answer is no. To understand why, it is necessary to unpack the goal of
depoliticizing investment disputes.88
Depoliticization of investment disputes through the introduction of in-
vestor-state arbitration is often portrayed as being about protecting investors
and immunizing their legal claims from interference by the home state and
the underlying treaty party relationship. I argue, by contrast, that the pri-
mary goal of depoliticization is about protecting home states by enabling
investors to bring claims and thus freeing home states from having to be-
come involved in investor-state disputes. Investment treaties could immu-
nize investors from interference with their claims by home states and the
treaty parties. However, as will be explained below, the mere introduction of
investor-state arbitration, without more, does not do so.
A. Three Understandings of Depoliticization
The introduction of investor-state arbitration is often explained by the
goal of depoliticizing investor-state disputes. However, three different—and
sometimes conflicting—justifications have been offered for this goal.
Protect Home States
Protect Host StatesProtect Investors
The first explanation focuses on protecting investors: depoliticization pro-
tects investors by enabling them to bring direct claims and thus insulating
those claims from interference by the treaty parties and the underlying state-
to-state relationship. For instance, Vandevelde, one of the U.S. negotiators
of investment treaties, explains that inclusion of investor-state arbitration
clauses “ensures investors of a neutral mechanism for settlement of invest-
ment disputes that is wholly insulated from the political relationship between
the investor’s government and the host government.”89 Likewise, the nego-
tiating history of ICSID provides that the Convention would offer a means
of “settling directly, on the legal plane, investment disputes and insulate
88. See also Martins Paparinskis, Limits of Depoliticisation in Contemporary Investor-State Arbitra-
tion, in 3 Select Proceedings of the European Society of International Law. 271–82 (James
Crawford & Sarah Nouwen eds., 2010) (discussing the complexity and over-use of the concept of diplo-
matic protection).
89. Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The Bilateral Investment Treaty Program of the United States, 21 Cornell
Int’l L.J. 201, 258 (1988). However, Vandevelde concludes that, “[a]t the same time, the BITs elimi-
nate none of the traditional remedies” as investors may still “pursue espousal of the claim by their own
governments” and the “BITs also provide for state-to-state arbitration of disputes arising out of the
interpretation or application of the agreement.” Id.
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such disputes from the realm of politics and diplomacy.”90 This explanation
is invoked in modern commentary and case law. For instance, Lowenfeld in a
recent arbitral award stated that the essence of investment treaties is that
“controversies between foreign investors and host states are insulated from
political and diplomatic relations between states.”91
The second explanation focuses on protecting home states: depoliticiza-
tion protects home states by enabling investors to bring direct claims and
thus stopping home states from having to become embroiled in investor-
state disputes. For instance, Vandevelde explains that the United States
sought the inclusion of investor-state arbitration to “provide investors with
a remedy that would not depend upon the involvement of the investor’s gov-
ernment in the dispute.”92 He goes on to explain that:
The situation in which an investor’s remedies are dependent upon
the involvement of the United States government is an unsatisfac-
tory one for both the investor and that government. From the
perspective of the United States government, the situation is un-
satisfactory because it may complicate or even impede the conduct
of foreign policy in the broad national interest.93
Permitting investors to bring direct claims against host states benefited in-
vestors because they no longer had to rely on their home state to decide
whether and how to prosecute their claims, but the real goal was freeing
home states from involvement in these disputes. As Daniel Price, one of the
U.S. negotiators of NAFTA, explains: by allowing the investor to “litigate
its claim directly, the investor’s sovereign could distance itself from the dis-
pute”94 and the investor could “resolve the dispute in a way that did not
engage the political organs of the two governments.”95
The third explanation focuses on protecting host states: depoliticization
protects host states by enabling investors to bring direct claims and thus
preventing or avoiding host states becoming victims of diplomatic pressure,
including through gunboat diplomacy. According to Ibrahim Shihata, the
longest-serving Secretary-General of the International Centre for Settlement
90. Int’l ctr. for Settlement of Inv. Disputes, Convention on the Settlement of Invest-
ment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States: Documents Concerning
the Origin and the Formulation of the Convention, Volume II-1 242  (1968).
91. Corn Products Int’l, Inc. v. Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/04/01, Decision on Responsibility
(Jan. 15, 2008), Separate Opinion of Arbitrator Lowenfeld, para 1.
92. Kenneth J. Vandevelde, United States Investment Treaties: Policy and Practice 163
(1992) (emphasis added).
93. Id. at 22–23.
94. Daniel M. Price, Chapter 11 – Private Party vs. Government, Investor-State Dispute Settlement: Franken-
stein or Safety Valve?, 26 Can.–U.S. L. J. 107, 112 (2000).
95. Daniel M. Price, Some Observations on Chapter Eleven of NAFTA, 23 Hastings Int’l & Comp. L.
Rev. 421, 427 (2000). Price notes that “[i]nvestors also welcomed this development because it gave
them the opportunity to seek redress without being held hostage to their own government’s political will
or whim. The investor’s claim would be decided on the merits and would not be subsumed within a
larger political or foreign relations dialogue between its government and the host government.”
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of Investment Disputes, investor-state disputes in the 19th and early 20th
centuries were “highly politicized and led to the frequent exercise of diplo-
matic protection, sometimes followed by the use of force. Latin American
countries in particular were exposed to abuses of diplomatic protection and,
at times, to armed intervention and occupation by foreign forces dispatched
by the governments of foreign investors.”96 The goal of depoliticization was
to protect host states by preventing or limiting uses and abuses of diplo-
matic protection.97
In the typical case, all three justifications overlap, so there will be no need
to disaggregate them or determine which one is primary. An investor will
be able to bring a claim, which will relieve the home state from having to
become involved and the home state will usually have no reason to wish to
become involved, and the host state will face one legal claim instead of
simultaneous legal claims or simultaneous diplomatic pressure and a legal
claim. Understanding and ordering these different justifications becomes
important, however, in the atypical case where the three do not overlap.
Here, we must understand the different consequences of depoliticization,
based on the above rationales, and determine which one was intended in the
particular treaty or might be preferred by ideal treaty parties.
B. Three Consequences of Depoliticization
In line with the first justification, a common narrative about depoliticiza-
tion is that it immunizes investors’ rights and claims from interference by
the home state and the underlying treaty party relationship. I contend that
this understanding is mistaken, both as an account of what existing treaty
parties have done and what ideal treaty parties would do. It is clear that the
introduction of investor-state arbitration enables investors to bring invest-
ment treaty claims without having to depend upon their home state for
diplomatic protection. There is little evidence to suggest, however, that the
insertion of this clause, without more, disables home states from engaging in
diplomatic protection or bringing international claims or immunizes investors
or their claims from interference by home states or the treaty parties.
96. Ibrahim Shihata, Towards a Greater Depoliticization of Investment Disputes: The Roles of ICSID and
MIGA, 1 ICSID Rev.–Foreign Inv. L. J. 1, 1 (1986).
97. Alejandro A´lvarez, Latin America and International Law, 3 Am. J. Int’l L. 269, 300 (1909); Sergio
Puig, Emergence and Dynamism in International Organizations: ICSID, Investor-State Arbitration, and Interna-
tional Investment Law, 44 Geo. J. of Int’l L. 531, 550–52 (2013).
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Enabling
DisablingImmunizing
In terms of what existing treaty parties have done, the standard modern
investment treaties contain two dispute resolution clauses: one permits in-
vestor-state arbitration over investment disputes; and the other permits
state-to-state arbitration over disputes about the interpretation and applica-
tion of the treaty.98 Most of these treaties contain no mechanism for priori-
tizing between these forms of dispute resolution, such as a hierarchical
ordering that privileges investor or state claims or a sequential ordering that
privileges the first claim filed.99 Some treaty regimes, such as the ICSID
Convention, impose limits on the ability of home states to engage in diplo-
matic protection once an investor has consented to investor-state
arbitration.100
The standard investment treaty and the ICSID-style clause require sepa-
rate analysis. Starting first with the standard treaty that permits investor-
state and state-to-state arbitration without including any prioritizing mech-
anism, the introduction of investor-state arbitration should be understood as
enabling rather than disabling. The provision enables investors to bring legal
claims so that the vast majority of investment disputes are settled without
involvement of the investor’s home state. It does not, however, disable home
states from exercising diplomatic protection or bringing state-to-state
claims if they wish to become involved. Nor does it immunize investors or
their claims from the underlying treaty party relationship. In this way, it
was primarily designed to protect home states rather than host states or
investors.
Vandevelde confirms that modern U.S. investment treaties introduced in-
vestor-state arbitration but “eliminate none of the remedies previously available,”
in particular, they still provide for “state-to-state arbitration of disputes
arising out of the interpretation or application of a BIT, should the investor’s
98. See, e.g., 2012 U.S. Model BIT, supra note 21, arts. 24, 37; German Model Treaty Concerning the
Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments arts. 9, 10, 2008, available at http://www.ita
law.com/sites/default/files/archive/ita1025.pdf [hereinafter 2008 German Model BIT]; 2004 Canadian
Model BIT, supra note 67, arts. 24, 48; France Draft Agreement on the Reciprocal Promotion and Pro-
tection of Investments arts. 7, 10, 2006, available at http://italaw.com/documents/ModelTreatyFrance
2006.pdf [hereinafter 2006 French Model BIT]; 2007 Colombian Model BIT, supra note 74, arts. 9, 10;
2003 Indian Model BIT, supra note 74, arts. 9, 10.
99. See generally Roberts, supra note 4. R
100. ICSID Convention, supra note 76, art. 27.
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLI\56-2\HLI201.txt unknown Seq: 41 21-AUG-15 12:02
2015 / Triangular Treaties 393
state wish to become involved in a particular dispute.” 101 Home states favored
inclusion of investor-state arbitration to avoid becoming embroiled in every
investor-state dispute. It does not follow that they intended to preclude them-
selves from involvement in any investor-state disputes. The politicization of
the system is significantly reduced because investors can bring claims di-
rectly without being subject to political whims in every case. That does not
mean that the home state may never pursue state-to-state arbitration in con-
nection with a particular investor or investment.
It is possible for states to enact treaties that simultaneously enable inves-
tor-state arbitration and disable home state exercises of diplomatic protec-
tion. For instance, the ICSID Convention provides that, once an investor
accepts the host state’s offer to arbitrate, a home state may no longer engage
in diplomatic protection unless and until the host state fails to comply with
the award in that dispute.102 A similar clause exists in a substantial minority
of investment treaties.103 However, even if a treaty disables home state inter-
vention, this may be to protect host states from having to fight on legal and
diplomatic planes with investors and home states respectively or to protect
investors by immunizing their claims from the underlying treaty party rela-
tionship. One would need to examine the text and drafting history of the
treaty to determine which possibility was the case.
It is important to consider for whose benefit a disabling clause has been
introduced because that is the party that should have the ability to waive
enforcement of the provision. If the disabling clause was intended to protect
host states rather than investors, it could be waived by those host states if
they preferred to deal with the issue on the state-to-state plane. If the disa-
bling clause was intended to immunize investors’ claims, host states could
not waive this right even if they preferred to deal with the issue on the
inter-state level. References to both justifications can be found in the negoti-
ating history of the ICSID Convention, but the dominant aim in that treaty
appears to have been protecting host states rather than immunizing inves-
tors’ claims.104
The Executive Directors’ Report to the ICSID Convention explains that:
“When a host State consents to the submission of a dispute with an investor
to the Centre, thereby giving the investor direct access to an international
jurisdiction, the investor should not be in a position to ask his State to
101. Vandevelde, supra note 92 at 163–64 (emphasis added).
102. ICSID Convention, supra note 76, art. 27.
103. For a breakdown of different treaty provisions, see Paparinskis, supra note 7, at 284–85. R
104. See, e.g., 2 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States
and Nationals of Other States: Documents Concerning the Origin and the Formulation
of the Convention, pt. 1, at 303 (1968) [hereinafter Settlement of Investment Disputes] (ex-
plaining that the disabling clause would “serve the best interests of investors, host States and the cause of
international co-operation generally” and that this was better than the existing situation of diplomatic
protection “which would transform the controversy into a dispute between States, a result more often
than not distasteful or embarrassing to all the parties concerned”).
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espouse his case and that State should not be permitted to do so.”105 Similar
explanations are offered throughout the drafting history, including that:
As a corollary of the principle of allowing an investor direct and
effective access to a foreign State without the intervention of his
national State it was proposed – and this was an important inno-
vation – that an investor’s national State would no longer be able
to espouse a claim of its national. In this way it was sought to ensure
that States would not be faced with having to deal with a multiplicity of
claims and claimants. The Convention would therefore offer a
means of settling directly, on the legal plane, investment disputes
between the State and the foreign investor and insulate such dis-
putes from the realm of politics and diplomacy.106
As Schreuer explains in his Commentary on the ICSID Convention:
A combination of arbitration and diplomatic protection would
lead to undesirable results. The balance of interests between the
parties would be upset if the host State, after consenting to inter-
national arbitration, remained exposed to diplomatic protection
by the investor’s home State. In fact, the guarantee against diplo-
matic protection may constitute a strong incentive for the host
State to consent to arbitration. Also the arbitration process be-
tween the host State and the foreign investor could be severely
hampered by simultaneous efforts to pursue the claim through
diplomatic channels.107
One of the advantages of adopting a third-party-beneficiary model is that
it creates a structure in which treaty parties could expressly enable investor-
state arbitration and disable home states from engaging in diplomatic pro-
tection and immunize investors’ claims from interference by the treaty par-
ties and their underlying relationship. But the first does not necessarily
imply the second, and even the first and second do not necessarily imply the
third.
What the treaty parties have elected to do in a particular treaty must be
analyzed according to the text and drafting history of that treaty. However,
as a default rule for the standard investment treaty, the introduction of in-
vestor-state arbitration should be understood as enabling but not disabling
or immunizing. With respect to the ICSID Convention and similar treaties,
105. Report of the Executive Directors on the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States
and Nationals of Other States, 1 ICSID Rep. 23, 30 (R. Rayfuse ed. 1993).
106. See Settlement of Investment Disputes, supra note 104, at 372 (emphasis added); see also id.
at 242, 303, 372, 464 (all making substantially the same point); id. at 348 (“What was excluded was the
traditional legal right of a State to espouse the cause of one of its nationals through the usual interna-
tional channels, thus protecting the host State from exposure to the risk of multiple claims.”).
107. Christoph Schreuer, The ICSID Convention: A Commentary 416 (2d ed. 2009).
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the default rule would be that the provisions should be understood as ena-
bling and disabling but not immunizing.
There is little reason to believe that ideal treaty parties would reach a
different default rule. There is no evidence that investors are avoiding mak-
ing efficient foreign investments because they are concerned about the po-
tential for their home state individually or the treaty parties collectively to
interfere with their claims in rare circumstances at some point down the
road. Home states have little incentive to give up their ability to take over
their investors’ claims in extreme situations in order to protect other impor-
tant interests. The treaty parties have even less incentive to collectively bind
their hands to revoke or modify investment treaties that no longer serve
their joint interests. Although such unilateral or joint action is unlikely to
occur ex post, ideal treaty parties would have little reason to give up such
powers ex ante because doing so would involve real costs while giving them
few gains.
V. Application to Current Controversies
Unpacking and retheorizing the goal of depoliticization in this way is
useful in applying the triangular theory of investment treaty rights to ex-
isting and emerging controversies, such as whether home states can settle
their investors’ claims, whether host states can invoke countermeasures as a
defense, and whether the treaty parties can jointly terminate investment
treaties with immediate effect.
A. Settlement of Claims
Can a home state bring and settle a class action diplomatic protection
claim on behalf of its investors, including without their knowledge or con-
sent? The answer is yes, though it may face actions for expropriation
through its domestic courts.
Starting with the public international law premise, a state is entitled to
exercise diplomatic protection on behalf of its nationals. Under the theory of
diplomatic protection, an injury to a foreign national was understood to be
an injury to that national’s home state, thus giving the home state complete
discretion over the claim’s handling.108 According to the Permanent Court
of International Justice: “by taking up the case of one of its subjects and by
resorting to diplomatic action or international judicial proceedings on his
behalf, a State is in reality asserting its own right, the right to ensure, in the
108. Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co. Ltd. (Belg. v. Spain), Judgment, 1970 I.C.J. 3, 44, 46,
¶¶ 77–78, 85; Emmerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations or the Principles of Natural Law
Applied to the Conduct and to the Affairs of Nations and Sovereigns 136 (Charles G. Fen-
wick trans., ed. 1916) (1758).
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person of its subjects, respect for the rules of international law.”109 The
home state had complete discretion to bring or not to bring a claim on
behalf of its investors and to settle that claim on any terms it saw fit.
The standard account should be modified by the introduction of third-
party-beneficiary doctrines given that investment treaties are entered into by
states but create enforceable rights to investors as third parties. The treaty
parties could use this structure to: (1) enable investors to bring direct
claims; (2) disable home states from engaging in diplomatic protection; and/
or (3) immunize investors’ claims from any interference by the treaty parties.
They could also make these rights or powers conditional or limited. For
instance, the treaty parties could provide that investors do not need the
consent of their home state to bring a claim, but that the claim could be
halted by the objection of the home state (conditional rights). Or they could
provide that home states are generally barred from engaging in diplomatic
protection, subject to an exception to protect the home state’s essential se-
curity interests (limited rights).
How and to what extent the treaty parties have used the third-party-
beneficiary paradigm to qualify the traditional public international law ap-
proach must be analyzed according to the text and drafting history of the
particular investment treaty. With respect to the standard investment
treaty, the starting assumption should be that the home states can bring and
settle diplomatic protection claims, regardless of opposition by their inves-
tors and host states, because investors-state arbitration is enabling not disa-
bling or immunizing. As for the ICSID Convention and treaties adopting a
similar provision, the starting assumption should be that home states can
bring and settle diplomatic protection claims, but only with the consent of
host states if an investor-state claim has already been filed, because investor-
state arbitration is enabling and disabling but not immunizing.
To understand why ideal treaty parties would be likely to retain the right
of home states to bring and settle claims on behalf of their investors, con-
sider a situation like the Iran-U.S. hostage crisis, discussed above. Imagine if
an investment treaty had existed between the United States and Iran. Would
it have been in the interests of those states to have created absolute and
inalienable rights for investors that the states could not settle in order to
resolve a major and dangerous foreign policy crisis? It seems highly unlikely
that ideal treaty parties would have wanted to bind their hands in a way that
would prevent them from reaching an agreement like the sort reached in
this case, even if an investment treaty existed.
109. Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions (Greece v. U.K.), 1924 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 2, at 12 (Aug.
30) (emphasis added); see also Frank Berman, The Relevance of the Law on Diplomatic Protection in Investment
Arbitration, in 2 Investment Treaty Law: Current Issues 67, 68 (Federico Ortino et al. eds., 2007)
(explaining that diplomatic protection involves a “State adopting, in its own right, the cause of its
national”).
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Although investment protection is important, a case such as this shows
that investment protection can be at odds with the essential security inter-
ests of the home and host states and those states would have little incentive
to tie their joint hands in a way that would prevent them from dealing with
these crises. It seems entirely possible that an investment treaty might help
to solve some of the hold-up costs that might otherwise prevent U.S. inves-
tors investing in Iran due to fears of unreasonable unilateral actions by Iran
as the home state. However, there is no evidence to support the notion that
investors would fail to invest unless they were also protected against these
sorts of joint actions.
However, we should not forget the public law qualification. Even if home
states could bring and settle diplomatic protection claims without the con-
sent of their investors, that does not mean that they would be immune from
political pressure or legal suits based on their vertical public law relation-
ships with their investors. Under public international law, the exercise of
diplomatic protection is discretionary, but there are movements towards en-
couraging (and possibly requiring) home states to take into account the
views and wishes of their nationals in deciding whether and how to bring
such claims.110 This is evident from Article 19 of the Draft Articles on Dip-
lomatic Protection, which include the following “recommended practice[s]”
for how states should exercise diplomatic protection:
A State entitled to exercise diplomatic protection according to the
present draft articles, should:
(a) Give due consideration to the possibility of exercising diplo-
matic protection, especially when a significant injury has
occurred;
(b) Take into account, wherever feasible, the views of injured per-
sons with regard to resort to diplomatic protection and the repara-
tion to be sought; and
(c) Transfer to the injured person any compensation obtained for
the injury from the responsible State subject to any reasonable
deductions.111
The Commentary treats these recommended practices as instances of pro-
gressive development of the law, rather than codification,112 but notes that
there was some debate over whether Article 19(b) represents an existing
110. ILC Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection with Commentaries, supra note 24, art. 19. (“A R
State has the right to exercise diplomatic protection on behalf of a national. It is under no duty or
obligation to do so. The internal law of a State may oblige a State to extend diplomatic protection to a
national, but international law imposes no such obligation . . . . Today there is support in domestic
legislation and judicial decisions for the view that there is some obligation, however limited, either under
national law or international law, on the State to protect its nationals abroad when they have been
subjected to serious violation of their human rights . . . .”).
111. Id. art. 19.
112. See id. art. 19, commentary at 94–95.
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customary requirement,113 while Article 19(c) is supported by some state
practice and considerations of equity.114
Even if an investor would not have a claim against its home state under
public international law, it could potentially have such a claim under its
domestic law, which it might bring before domestic courts, or, in certain
jurisdictions, before international tribunals like the European Court of
Human Rights.115 The claim would be that the investor’s government
wrongly expropriated the investor’s treaty rights by, for instance, settling
the investor’s actual or potential claim for a nominal amount without the
investor’s consent. The permissibility of such a claim, and its prospects for
success, would depend on the public law regime applicable within the par-
ticular domestic legal context.
In the United States, for instance, this claim would take the form of argu-
ing that the government engaged in a taking of the investor’s treaty claim.
Outside of the investment treaty context, claims have been brought by U.S.
investors when the U.S. government has settled their claims against foreign
states, either without the investors’ consent or for less than the investors
thought the claim was worth.116 U.S. courts have treated these legal claims
as property but have often been reluctant to find an expropriation on the
facts. For instance, in claims arising out of the Iran-U.S. Hostage Crisis, the
United States Supreme Court ruled that the U.S. government could extin-
guish the domestic claims of U.S. nationals without this amounting to an
expropriation because the government created the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal
and gave it jurisdiction to hear these claims.117
The existence of an investment treaty right to bring a legal claim, partic-
ularly where this right has already been exercised, increases the prospect of
113. See id. at 97 (“In practice States exercising diplomatic protection do have regard to the moral and
material consequences of an injury to an alien in assessing the damages to be claimed. In order to do this
it is obviously necessary to consult with the injured person. So, too, with the decision whether to demand
satisfaction, restitution or compensation by way of reparation. This has led some scholars to contend that
the admonition contained in draft article 19, subparagraph (b), is already a rule of customary interna-
tional law. If it is not, draft article 19, subparagraph (b), must also be seen as an exercise in progressive
development.”).
114. See id. at 100 (“Although there is some support for curtailing the absolute right of the State to
withhold payment of compensation received to the injured national in national legislation, judicial deci-
sions and doctrine, this probably does not constitute a settled practice. Nor is there any sense of obliga-
tion on the part of States to limit their freedom of disposal of compensation awards. On the other hand,
public policy, equity and respect for human rights support the curtailment of the States discretion in the
disbursement of compensation. It is against this background that draft article 19, subparagraph (c), has
been adopted. While it is an exercise in progressive development it is supported by State practice and
equity.”)
115. An investor might also bring a claim arguing that, by jointly terminating or amending the
treaty, the home state violated certain fiduciary obligations owed to its investors. Again, such a claim
would be novel.
116. See, e.g., Abrahim-Youri v. United States, 139 F.3d 1462 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Alliance of Descend.
of Tex. Land Grants v. United States, 37 F.3d 1478 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Shanghai Power Co. v. United
States, 4 Cl. Ct. 237 (1983), af’d, 765 F.2d 159 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
117. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 688–90 (1981).
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states trying to accommodate the interests of investors by creating an alter-
native mechanism for redress, like the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal. Failing
that, these factors make it more likely that domestic courts will treat the
claim as a property right and require some level of compensation in the
event a taking is found. When refusing to find a taking in the context of
other claims, domestic courts have noted that investors might have had
claims against foreign states but that they had no forum in which to bring
their claims and thus were lucky to have received any settlement amount on
account of the government’s actions. As investment treaties give investors
such a forum, the abrogation of such rights—particularly after a claim has
been brought—is more likely to constitute a taking if appropriate compen-
sation is not paid and no alternative forum is created.
B. Availability of Countermeasures
Can a host state rely on inter-state countermeasures in response to a previ-
ous wrong by the home state as a defense in an investor-state arbitral claim?
The answer is yes, but likely only where the countermeasures have previ-
ously been agreed to by the home state or ruled valid by a state-to-state
tribunal.118
Starting with the public international law premise, State A is permitted
to take measures that would otherwise be contrary to the international obli-
gations it owes to State B if those measures were taken in response to an
internationally wrongful act by State B.  However, the Draft Articles on
State Responsibility provide that State A “may only take countermeasures
against a State which is responsible for an internationally wrongful act,”119
i.e., State B.  As the ILC’s Commentary on the Draft Articles explains:
Countermeasures may not be directed against States other than
the responsible State.  In a situation where a third State is owed
an international obligation by the State taking countermeasures
and that obligation is breached by the countermeasure, the
wrongfulness of the measure is not precluded against the third
State.120
The Draft Articles on State Responsibility do not address the permissibil-
ity of countermeasures vis-a`-vis a non-state actor to whom a treaty grants
direct rights,121 so the analysis requires reasoning by analogy in the invest-
ment treaty context. The first step is to determine whether investment trea-
ties create rights for investors or not. This is because public international
law, like domestic contract law, distinguishes between third parties that
118. For a somewhat analogous approach based on an idea of dependent investor rights, see Losari and
Ewing-Chow, supra note 57, at 297–99. R
119. Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 28, art. 49(1) (emphasis added). R
120. Id. art. 49(1), Commentary (4).
121. Id. art. 33(2), Commentary (4).
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have enforceable rights and those that are mere beneficiaries. As the ILC’s
Commentaries explain, the prohibition on countermeasures as a defense to
violating the rights of third-party states “does not mean that countermea-
sures may not incidentally affect the position of third States or indeed other
third parties.”122 For example:
[I]f the injured State suspends transit rights with the responsible
State in accordance with this chapter, other parties, including
third States, may be affected thereby. If they have no individual
rights in the matter they cannot complain. The same is true if, as a
consequence of suspension of a trade agreement, trade with the
responsible State is affected and one or more companies lose busi-
ness or even go bankrupt. Such indirect or collateral effects cannot
be entirely avoided.123
If investors have not been granted rights, they cannot complain about
inter-state countermeasures being used to infringe upon their rights. If
countermeasures could be used as a defense in a state-to-state claim, they
may also be used as a defense in an investor-state claim. On this account,
investors in the investment treaty regime are susceptible to countermeasures
just as traders in the international trade regime are susceptible to counter-
measures because both are mere beneficiaries rather than third-party rights
holders. However, as described above, there are good reasons to distinguish
between investors and traders: trade treaties do not grant individuals a direct
right of action, whereas investment treaties permit investors to bring direct
claims against host states to enforce treaty obligations.
Even if we assume that investors have third-party rights, instead of being
mere beneficiaries, this does not automatically make investors immune to
the defense of countermeasures given the tripartite nature of the treaty rela-
tionship. If A, B, and C enter into a treaty where they all grant each other
rights, and if B violates its obligations to A, it is permissible for A to rely on
countermeasures as a defense against its obligations vis-a`-vis B but not vis-a`-
vis C. This makes sense because all of the rights are separate and indepen-
dently held. It is not clear, however, that the same analysis should apply
where A and B enter into a treaty that gives C a right, as C’s right might
better be understood as qualified by the initial treaty and contingent to
some extent on the ongoing actions of A and B.
Here, the third-party-beneficiary paradigm becomes helpful in qualifying
the traditional public international law premise. According to the
UNIDROIT Principles, unless the contracting parties agree otherwise, the
default rule would be that “[t]he promisor may assert against the beneficiary
all defenses which the promisor could assert against the promisee.”124 The
122. Id. art. 49(1), Commentary (5).
123. Id. (emphasis added).
124. UNIDROIT Principles, supra note 51, art. 5.2.4. R
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beneficiary is given an enforceable right, but it comes subject to defenses
that arise from the contractual relationship out of which it was created. As
the UNIDROIT Commentary explains: “[a]ll major legal systems allow the
promisor to assert against the beneficiary all the defences that the promisor
could assert against the promisee,” though usually “only defences arising
out of the contractual relationship which confers a benefit on the third party
will be available to the promisor.”125
Eisenberg explains the rationale for the rule in the following way:
Suppose that an empowered beneficiary brings suit against a
promisor, and that if the promisee had sued the promisor, the
promisor would have been able to raise a given defense, such as
lack of consideration or fraud.  Can the promisor raise the same
defense against the beneficiary?  The answer should be and is yes,
because by analogy to the third-party-beneficiary principle, gener-
ally speaking the promisor should be no worse off if she is sued by
the beneficiary than she would have been if she had been sued by
the promisee. This rule is uncontroversial.126
In the HFCS cases discussed above, Mexico agreed to offer investment
protections to U.S. investors, but this is presumptively conditional on the
United States offering various benefits to Mexico by way of quid pro quo.
These benefits include trade obligations, such as the U.S. opening its mar-
kets to Mexican sugar producers, and investment obligations, such as the
U.S. not violating investment protections it owes to Mexican investors. If
Mexico has not received the quid, it should not be required to pay the quo.
That is what the defense of countermeasures is all about. Of course, the
defense is limited in various ways, such as requiring notice and proportional-
ity. But, in essence, it applies to reciprocal treaty regimes.
This analysis would suggest that states should presumptively be able to
rely upon inter-state countermeasures as a defense in investor-state disputes
but that this would be available only in response to wrongful conduct by the
other treaty party under the relevant treaty. Countermeasures could poten-
tially play a significant role in free trade agreements, which include a wide
variety of investment and trade law obligations, but would be less likely to
play a significant role in investment treaties that include investment obliga-
tions only and often have asymmetrically situated treaty parties where one is
a clear capital importer and the other is a clear capital exporter.
However, this is a default rule only. The treaty parties could expressly or
impliedly exclude the availability of countermeasures as a defense in inves-
tor-state disputes. In the human rights context, for instance, the Draft Arti-
cles on State Responsibility provide that countermeasures cannot be directed
125. Commentary on the UNIDROIT Principles, supra note 52, art. 5.2.4 at 602. R
126. Eisenberg, supra note 38. R
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against “fundamental human rights.”127 They do not exclude the applica-
tion of countermeasures to any and all rights granted to non-state actors,
including investor rights. Instead, the exclusion is limited to fundamental
human rights. This might partly reflect that human rights treaties are more
like concurrent unilateral pledges by states to protect persons subject to
their jurisdiction than reciprocal, quid pro quo exchanges like investment
treaties.128 It may also reflect the more strongly normative character of “fun-
damental” human rights.
As a matter of theory, the introduction of investor-state arbitration en-
ables investors to bring direct claims but it does not immunize those claims
from the underlying treaty relationship. As a matter of practice, however,
investor-state tribunals are permitted to rule upon whether a host state has
breached its obligations with respect to a particular investor, but they are
not granted jurisdiction to determine the predicate issue of whether the host
state’s action was a valid countermeasure in response to a previous violation
by the investor’s home state. If the validity of the countermeasures had been
previously agreed by the treaty parties or had been ruled upon by a state-to-
state tribunal, then a successful defense might be mounted. Failing that,
however, investor-state tribunals have no jurisdiction to rule on this defense.
Particularly in the context of free trade agreements that include an invest-
ment chapter, we should not assume that the express inclusion of investment
rights amounts to the implied preclusion of traditional trade law remedies,
like authorized countermeasures. Such an approach would allow the inclu-
sion of investor-state arbitration to impliedly undermine one of the key ele-
ments of trade treaties. This also brings the public law qualification to
mind. Even if a host state is successfully able to plead countermeasures as a
defense against an investor-state claim, that does not mean that the investor
has no remedy available to it. In trade law, a violation with respect to one
product (e.g., cars) can give rise to a right to engage in countermeasures
with respect to another product (e.g., bananas). The banana grower must
then rely on political pressure against its home state, or legal avenues availa-
ble through the home state’s courts, to put pressure on its state to reverse its
position vis-a`-vis the car manufacturers. The same would be true here for the
investor.
127. Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 28, art. 50(1)(b). R
128. See Roberts, supra note 22 at 71 (“Human rights are typically understood as a good in their own R
right, whereas investor rights might be viewed as a means to the end of increasing foreign investment,
rather than an end in and of themselves.”); Paparinskis, supra note 5 at 623 (suggesting that a human R
rights framework “fails to capture the structural dynamic of the [investment arbitration] regime. In
particular, the grant of investment protection is explicitly linked with and justified by utilitarian consid-
erations of enticing the non-state actor consciously to make the choice of entering the particular re-
gime.”); Roberts, supra note 4 at 37–38. R
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C. The Permissibility of Joint Termination
Can the treaty parties agree to jointly terminate or amend an investment
treaty with immediate effect and thereby avoid the ten to twenty year sur-
vival clause that typically applies to unilateral terminations? The answer is
yes, though compensation might sometimes be required.
Investment treaties typically contain a number of mechanisms to enhance
the stability of investment treaty obligations. Many investment treaties con-
tain long initial terms, often remaining in effect for an initial period of ten
years or more (“initial term”).129 At the end of the initial period, investment
treaties typically provide that a treaty party can terminate the treaty, but (1)
this usually requires a notice period, often of one year’s duration (“notice
provision”); and (2) the treaty’s protections continue to apply to investments
established or acquired prior to the date of termination for a set period, often
ten to twenty years (“survival clause”).130 The U.S. Model BIT provides a
relatively standard formulation:
Article 22: Entry into Force, Duration, and Termination
1. This Treaty shall . . . remain in force for a period of ten years
and shall continue in force thereafter unless terminated in ac-
cordance with paragraph 2.
2. A Party may terminate this Treaty at the end of the initial ten-
year period or at any time thereafter by giving one year’s writ-
ten notice to the other Party.
3. For ten years from the date of termination, all other Articles shall
continue to apply to covered investments established or acquired prior to
the date of termination, except insofar as those Articles extend to
the establishment or acquisition of covered investments.131
By contrast, investment protections in free trade agreements are often not
subject to survival rights. Instead, many permit either treaty party to termi-
nate, often with just six months’ notice.132
129. See, e.g., 2007 Colombian Model BIT, supra note 74, art. XIII(1); 2006 French Model BIT, supra
note 98, art. 11; 2008 German Model BIT, supra note 98, art. 13(2); 2003 Indian Model BIT, supra note
74, art. 15(1); Agreement Between the People’s Republic of China and the Federal Republic of Germany
on the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, China-Ger., art. 15(2), Dec. 1, 2003,
available at http://arbitrationlaw.com/files/free_pdfs/china-germany_bit_0.pdf [hereinafter China-Ger-
many BIT]; Agreement Between the Government of the Argentine Republic and the Government of
New Zealand for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, N.Z.-Arg., art. 14(2), Aug.
27, 1999, available at http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/other_treaties/text.jsp?file_id=247273 [hereinaf-
ter Argentina-NZ BIT].
130. See, e.g., 2004 Canadian Model BIT, supra note 67, art. 52.3; 2007 Colombian Model BIT, supra
note 74, art. XIII (2) and (3); 2006 French Model BIT, supra note 98, art. 11; 2008 German Model BIT,
supra note 98, arts. 13(2) and (3); 2003 Indian Model BIT, supra note 74, arts. 15(1) and (2); China-
Germany BIT, supra note 129, arts. 15(3) and (4); Argentina-NZ BIT, supra note 129, arts. 14(2) and (3).
131. 2012 U.S. Model BIT, supra note 21, art. 22 (emphasis added).
132. See, e.g., NAFTA, supra note 82, art. 2205; Australia-U.S. FTA, supra note 73, art. 23.4; Panama-
Taiwan FTA, supra note 75, art. 21.05; New Zealand-China FTA, supra note 67, art. 213(3); Korea-
Singapore FTA, supra note 75, art. 22.6.
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Survival clauses may be understood as provisions on the vesting of inves-
tors’ rights. If an investor makes an investment and the home or host state
subsequently withdraws, the investors’ rights continue to apply for another
ten or more years. These stability provisions clearly protect against unilat-
eral withdrawal with immediate effect (first and second-order relations), but
what about joint termination and amendment (third-order relations)?
Starting with a public international law premise, the standard assumption
would be that the general VCLT rules would apply in the absence of a clause
on termination or amendment. According to the VCLT, termination may
take place: (a) in conformity with the provisions of the treaty; or (b) at any
time by consent of all the parties after consultation with the other con-
tracting States.133 Under (a), termination might be permissible but subject
to the survival clause on the theory that joint termination is the equivalent
of two unilateral withdrawals. Under (b), however, states would be able to
agree to terminate immediately at any time, thereby circumventing the sur-
vival clause.
In the absence of an amendment clause, the VCLT rule is that “[a] treaty
may be amended by agreement between the parties.”134 Thus the treaty par-
ties could agree to amend the substantive provisions of the treaty to move
from older-style protections (that are more investor protective) to newer-
style protections (which carve out greater protections for state sover-
eignty).135 They could also amend the treaty to eliminate these protections
altogether or to remove the right of investors to bring investor-state claims.
The treaty parties could also eliminate or curtail procedural protections, like
the existence and length of the survival clause. The general assumption is
that termination and amendment apply prospectively, but the treaty parties
can manifest a contrary intention.
The VCLT recognizes some protections for existing rights, providing
that: “Unless the treaty otherwise provides or the parties otherwise agree,
the termination of a treaty under its provisions or in accordance with the
present Convention: . . . (b) does not affect any right, obligation or legal
situation of the parties created through the execution of the treaty prior to
its termination.”136 However, that provides little comfort to investors be-
cause the provision applies to rights of the treaty parties, not rights of third
parties like investors. In addition, this default rule is subject to a contrary
agreement by the treaty parties, which brings us back to the same third-
order problem.
The possibilities of joint termination and amendment are potentially sig-
nificant in the current transformation of the investment treaty system.
133. VCLT, supra note 26, art. 54. R
134. VCLT, supra note 26, art. 39. R
135. On the transition from older-style investment treaties to newer-style ones, see Roberts, supra note
22 at 78–83 (using the terminology of first- and second-generation treaties). R
136. VCLT, supra note 26, art. 70(1). R
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Older-style treaties were typically skewed in favor of investor protection be-
cause they were drafted by developed states that were primarily interested in
protecting their investors abroad. Now that many developed states have had
investor-state claims brought against them, and states have witnessed the
sometimes broad and unexpected interpretations given by investor-state
tribunals, they have become more sensitive to the regulatory needs of host
states. As a result, they are drafting newer-style treaties that seek to re-
calibrate the balance between investor protection and state sovereignty.137
Drafting new treaties going forward does little to redress imbalances in
the existing system given that more than 3,000 treaties already exist, many
of which are older in style.138 A number of states are aiming to close this gap
through joint termination and amendment.139 Whereas investment treaty
rights vest at the point of investment vis-a`-vis unilateral termination, the
treaties do not provide a similar rule about vesting vis-a`-vis joint
termination.
There are good reasons why ideal treaty parties might accept limitations
on their powers as home and host states without accepting limitations on
their joint powers as treaty parties. The purposes of investment treaties are
to provide investor protection in order to promote foreign investment while
not overly compromising state sovereignty. If it turns out that increased
investment protection does not in fact result in an increase in investment
promotion, let alone an increase in home and host state development, we
should expect treaty parties to want to be able to revoke their commitments.
Or if it turns out that arbitral tribunals interpret vague language in very
investor-friendly ways, such that investor protection is systematically privi-
leged over state sovereignty, we should expect treaty parties to want to be
able to modify their commitments in order to redress this balance.
There are examples of treaty parties having been found to have created
irrevocable rights for non-state actors. In the human rights sphere, treaties
can provide that treaty parties may withdraw, and states have withdrawn in
such circumstances.140 But when North Korea attempted to withdraw from
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which is a human
137. See Roberts, supra note 22 at 78–83. R
138. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), World Investment Report
2014 - Investing in the SDGs: An Action Plan, xxiii–xxiv (2014).
139. See UNCTAD, International Investment Policymaking in Transition: Challenges and Opportunities of
Treaty Renewal, IIA Issues Note (2013), available at http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/web
diaepcb2013d9_en.pdf; Kathryn Gordon and Joachim Pohl, Investment Treaties over Time - Treaty Practice
and Interpretation in a Changing World, 32–39 (OECD Working Papers on International Investment,
2015), available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5js7rhd8sq7h-en. See also supra text accompanying notes
85–87. R
140. For example, Venezuela gave notice of its denunciation of the American Convention on Human
Rights pursuant to Article 78 of the Convention. See Gov’t of the Bolivarian Republic of Vene-
zuela, Ministry of the Popular Power for Foreign Affairs of the Bolivarian Republic of
Venezuela, Note 000125, 9 ¶ 2 (Sept. 6, 2012), available at http://www.oas.org/dil/esp/Nota_Republi
ca_Bolivariana_de_Venezuela_al_SG_OEA.PDF.
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rights treaty with no provision on withdrawal either way, the Human
Rights Committee ruled that it could not do so because it had created irrev-
ocable rights for the people of North Korea.141 According to the Committee:
The rights enshrined in the Covenant belong to the people living
in the territory of the State party. The Human Rights Committee
has consistently taken the view, as evidenced by its long-standing
practice, that once the people are accorded the protection of the
rights under the Covenant, such protection devolves with terri-
tory and continues to belong to them, notwithstanding change in
Government of the State party, including dismemberment in
more than one State or State succession or any subsequent action
of the State party designed to divest them of the rights guaran-
teed by the Covenant. The Committee is therefore firmly of the
view that international law does not permit a State which has
ratified or acceded or succeeded to the Covenant to denounce it or
withdraw from it.142
Given the sovereign nature of states, the idea that treaty parties could
create irrevocable rights for non-state actors is controversial, particularly
where they have not provided so expressly. The UN Secretary General, as the
ICCPR’s treaty depositary, took a different approach on this issue, holding
that North Korea could withdraw but only with the agreement of all of the
treaty parties.143 Whatever the merits of the Human Rights Committee’s
ruling in the human rights context, there is little reason to transpose this
reasoning to investment treaties given that investment treaties are recipro-
cal, quid pro quo bargains between states that involve rights of a lesser
normative quality than human rights.144 Investors have investment treaty
rights if and to the extent granted by states; these rights are not inherent in
the notion of being an investor like certain human rights are inherent in the
notion of being a human.
VI. The Possibility and Consequences of Vested Rights
Even if investment treaty rights remain revocable in general, should the
third-party beneficiary paradigm be used to qualify the traditional public
international law approach, permitting investors’ rights to vest at some
point and thereby become immutable? The public law qualification suggests
that, even if these rights are capable of vesting, they should not be under-
141. See General Comment 26 (61), U.N. Human Rights Committee.
142. Id., at ¶¶ 4–5.
143. See Notification of Withdrawal from the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
U.N. Doc. C.N.467.1997.TREATIES-10 (Depositary Notification) (Aug. 23, 1997) (“withdrawal from
the Covenant would not appear possible unless all States Parties to the Covenant agree with such a
withdrawal”).
144. Roberts, supra note 22 at 71; Paparinskis, supra note 5 at 623; Roberts, supra note 6 at 37–38. R
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stood as vesting at the same point and with the same consequences as in
classic private third-party-beneficiary models.145
The notion of vested rights is used to protect reliance interests of third
parties. Under domestic contract law, “[t]he parties may modify or revoke
the rights conferred by the contract on the beneficiary until the beneficiary
has accepted them or reasonably acted in reliance on them,” unless the con-
tract provides otherwise.146 According to the Commentary on the
UNIDROIT Principles, this rule seeks to strike a balance between “the in-
terest of the contracting parties in being able to revoke or modify the right
conferred on the beneficiary and the interest of the beneficiary in not being
unfairly deprived of its right.”147
In contract law, balancing these interests is achieved by “fixing a cut-off
point from which the parties’ entitlement to modify or revoke the right
expires” because the “right ceases to be inchoate and becomes ‘vested’ or
‘perfected.’ ” 148 The UNIDROIT Commentary notes that major common
law and civil law jurisdictions provide that the third party’s contractual
rights vest upon acceptance, such as by bringing a claim.149 In addition,
some common law jurisdictions also permit vesting based on reasonable reli-
ance, but there is less uniformity on this point.150
Under public law, sovereigns generally have the power to change laws
prospectively although some states recognize limits on their power to
change laws retroactively or to interfere with vested rights. In some states,
such as the United Kingdom, the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty
means that the legislature is entitled to pass new laws even where they
change the benefits and burdens of individuals subject to its jurisdiction.151
There is a strong presumption that new laws apply prospectively only,
which includes situations where the law is changed prospectively but oper-
ates with respect to previously existing facts.152 However, parliament does
145. Compare with Sourgens, supra note 33 at 371 (“The concept of the vesting of rights means that R
the contracting parties to the BIT have entirely abrogated their ability to amend, interpret, or affect the
rights of investor-beneficiaries once vested through acceptance or reliance.”).
146. UNIDROIT, art. 5.2.5.
147. Commentary on the UNIDROIT Principles, supra note 52, art. 5.2.5 at 605–06. R
148. Id. According to Eisenberg, “a modification or rescission should be effective against a third-party
beneficiary except to the extent that the beneficiary justifiably relied on the contract before the modifica-
tion or rescission.” Eisenberg, supra note 38. R
149. See Commentary on the UNIDROIT Principles, supra note 52, art. 5.2.5 at 606. R
150. See 17 AM. JUR. 2D Contracts §§ 450–51 (2009) (acceptance and reliance in United States);
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 311 (1981) (acceptance and reliance); Contracts (Rights of
Third Parties) Act, 1999, c. 31 (acceptance and reliance in England).
151. See generally Parliamentary Sovereignty, U.K. Parliament,  http://www.parliament.uk/about/how/
sovereignty/; Parliamentary Sovereignty, Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Parliamentary_sovereign
ty; and Ex Post Facto Law, Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ex_post_facto_law.
152. On the difference between retroactive and retrospective laws, see Benner v. Can. (Secretary of
State) (1997), 1 S.C.R. 358 at ¶ 39 (S.C.C.) (“A retroactive statute is one that operates as of a time prior
to its enactment. A retrospective statute is one that operates for the future only. It is prospective, but it
imposes new results in respect of a past event. A retroactive statute operates backwards. A retrospective
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have the power to enact retroactive laws, though it must usually do so
clearly and unambiguously.153
In other states, like the United States, constitutional constraints prevent
certain retroactive laws from being adopted. The U.S. Constitution prohibits
Congress and the states from passing ex post facto criminal or penal laws
and prohibits deprivation of property without due process of law.154 Con-
gress is entitled to change the law prospectively because “[n]o person has a
vested interest in any rule of law entitling him to insist that it shall remain
unchanged for his benefit.”155 However, when the legal framework changes
the consequences of past actions, it may interfere with vested property rights
and thus require certain due process guarantees to be observed or compensa-
tion to be paid.
The question in the investment treaty context is whether investors’ rights
are capable of vesting and, if so, when and with what consequences. Protect-
ing reliance interests of third parties against joint revision by the contract
parties is not necessarily at odds with the intention of those contracting par-
ties at the time of contracting. Just as a host state might have an interest in
binding its hands so as to prevent itself from opportunistically expropriating
a foreign investment later, it is possible that treaty parties might have an
interest in jointly binding their hands so that they cannot collectively re-
voke previously granted treaty protections.
However, the incentive of treaty parties to jointly bind their hands in this
way is significantly less clear than it is for them to agree jointly to bind
their hands unilaterally as host states. Unilateral actions of host states are
associated with hold-up costs in a way that joint actions of both treaty par-
ties are not. By contrast, treaty parties are likely to retain an interest in
being able to revoke or modify their commitments if the presumed balance
of burdens and benefits does not materialize. Even if treaty parties were to
agree to bind their hands in limited circumstances, it is not clear that the
private law tests of acceptance and reliance should define vesting. Instead,
the public law qualification suggests that some changes are required to
statute operates forwards, but it looks backwards in that it attaches new consequences for the future to an
event that took place before the statute was enacted.”).
153. There is debate about whether some rule of law limits might apply to retroactive legislation,
e.g., with respect to criminal prosecutions. The United Kingdom is party to human rights conventions
that prohibit retroactive changes in criminal laws and penalties. See Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, Europ.T.S. No. 5; 213 U.N.T.S. 221; Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 15, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171. However,
there is some authority for the proposition that this rule is also subject to the principle of parliamentary
sovereignty. See, e.g., Case 129/79, Macarthys Ltd. v Smith, I.C.R. 785, 789 (1970) per Lord Denning (“If
the time should come when our Parliament deliberately passes an Act with the intention of repudiating
the Treaty or any provision in it or intentionally of acting inconsistently with it—and says so in express
terms—then . . . it would be the duty of our courts to follow the statute of our Parliament.”).
154. See  U.S. Const. art. I §§ 9 and 10; amends. V and XIV.
155. N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 198 (1917).
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modify the standard third-party-beneficiary contract model in its applica-
tion in this context.
A. Making an Investment?
“Acceptance” of investment treaty rights through making an investment
should not be used as the test for vesting in the investment treaty context.
Acceptance is significant in the private law context because it “signifies that
there is consensus among the three parties concerning the transfer of rights,
that is all parties regard it as efficient.”156 However, if we conceptualize the
treaty parties as a joint sovereign that makes the law (i.e., the treaty), the
starting assumption would be that the sovereign is entitled to change that
law even if this revokes or modifies rights or benefits previously granted to
non-state actors subject to that law. An individual cannot lock in a favorable
law by notifying the sovereign that it accepts the law because the individual
and sovereign do not exist in a horizontal plane of equality.
As for “reliance” on treaty rights in making an investment, one should
also distinguish between the possibility of reliance, on the one hand, and
actual and reasonable reliance, on the other hand. In terms of actual reliance,
social science surveys suggest that investors typically do not know about or
rely upon their treaty rights when investing. Early studies from the 1970s
and 1980s suggested that business executives often lacked familiarity with
ICSID and did not view it as providing adequate safeguards against political
risks.157 More recently, when the European Commission asked European in-
vestors in 2000 about the role of investment treaties, half of the 300 respon-
dents had never heard of them and only ten percent had used them in their
professional activity.158 When Yackee surveyed general counsels of large
U.S.-based corporations in 2010, the median respondent described him or
herself as fairly unfamiliar with investment treaties, with only six percent
156. Aristides N. Hatzis, Rights and Obligations of Third Parties, in Encyclopedia of Law & Eco-
nomics. Vol. III. The Regulation of Contracts 200, 210 (Boudewijn Bouckaert and Gerrit De
Geest, eds., 2000) (“[A]cceptance of rights by the beneficiary should be the point at which these rights
are vested. Acceptance signifies that there is consensus among the three parties concerning the transfer of
rights, that is all parties regard it as efficient.”).
157. John K. Ryans & James C. Baker, The International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes
(ICSID), 10 J. World Trade L. 65, 70–71 (1976) (in a small survey of business executives, only sixteen
percent of respondents were “familiar” with ICSID and only four percent viewed the ICSID system as
providing “adequate safeguards”); James C. Baker, ICSID: An International Method for Handling Foreign
Investment Disputes in LDCs, 21 Foreign Trade Rev. 411, 417–20 (1987) (in a survey of Chief Financial
Officers of U.S. multinational companies, only eight percent of respondents believed ICSID provided a
“viable avenue” for settling disputes with foreign states and only five percent had a “working knowl-
edge” of ICSID).
158. Lauge N. Skovgaard Poulsen, The Importance of BITs for Foreign Direct Investment and Political Risk
Insurance: Revisiting the Evidence, Yearbook on International Investment Law & Policy 2009/
2010, Fig. 2 (2010) (citing the European Commission, Survey of Attitudes of the European Business
Community to International Investment Rules, conducted by T. N. Sofres Consulting on behalf of the
European Commission, DG Trade (2000)).
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reporting having declined to invest based on the absence of an investment
treaty.159
These statistics may not be representative of all industries or all compa-
nies, but they suggest that actual reliance on treaties at the point of making
an investment is less widespread than many lawyers assume. These surveys
are consistent with studies on the role of political risk analysis in corporate
decision making more generally, which find that companies typically do not
analyze political risks in an institutionalized or sophisticated manner.160
They are consistent with much law and society scholarship that finds that
formal law plays a minor role in many business decisions,161 including deci-
sions of whether or not to invest in a foreign market.162 If an investor is
unaware of or did not rely upon its rights, there will be no link between the
purposes of investor protection and investment promotion: the investor will
have suffered no detrimental reliance if its rights are revoked or modified
and the treaty parties will have gained no unfair benefit.
In terms of reasonable reliance, what investors can reasonably expect when
investing must be shaped by the terms of the treaty, any representations
made to specific investors, and the general public law relationship between
treaty parties (as joint sovereigns) and investors (as non-sovereign third-
party beneficiaries). If the treaty parties provide that their ongoing collective
sovereign prerogatives remain absolute (for example, allowing them to
jointly terminate at any time), investors cannot reasonably have relied on the
contrary. If the treaty parties provide that their collective sovereign powers
are limited (for example, by including an unamendable survival clause that
applies to joint termination), investors can reasonably rely upon that clause.
Specific representations may also shape expectations.
159. Jason Webb Yackee, Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Promote Foreign Direct Investment? Some Hints
from Alternative Evidence, 51 Va. J. Int’l L. 397, 428–30 (2011).
160. See, e.g., Stephen J. Kobrin, MANAGING POLITICAL RISK ASSESSMENT: STRATEGIC RE-
SPONSE TO ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE (1982); Stephen J. Kobrin, Political Risk: A Review and
Reconsideration, 10 J. Int’l Bus. Stud. 67, 68, 74 (1979); Marie E. Wicks Kelly & George C. Philip-
patos, Comparative Analysis of the Foreign Investment Evaluation Practices by U.S.-Based Manufacturing Mul-
tinational Companies, 13 J. Int’l Bus. Stud. 19, 24 (1982); Antoine Van Agtmael, How Business Has
Dealt with Political Risk, Fin. Executive 26 Jan. 1976, at 26; see also Mark Fitzpatrick, The Definition and
Assessment of Political Risk in International Business: A Review of the Literature, 8 Acad. Mgmt. Rev. 249,
251–53 (1983); Charles Pahud de Mortanges & Vivian Allers, Political Risk Assessment: Theory and the
Experience of Dutch Firms, 5 Int’l Bus. Rev. 303, 317 (1996).
161. See Yackee, supra note 159, at 433 (citing Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business:
A Preliminary Study, 28 Am. Soc. Rev. 1, 9–12 (1963); Mark C. Suchman, The Contract as Social Artifact,
37 Law & Soc’y Rev. 91, 96 (2003)).
162. Tamara Lothian & Katharina Pistor, Local Institutions, Foreign Investment and Alternative Strategies
of Development: Some Views from Practice, 42 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 101, 109 (2003) (“law plays a minor
role in the initial decision to enter a market. . . .  Although legal considerations may weigh heavily once a
strategic decision is taken, legal concerns are not themselves the driving force in the initial calculation.
Instead, other factors play a greater role, such as the importance of access to raw materials, the size and
scope of the foreign market, or the geographical position of the target country in relation to other
important markets.”).
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In the absence of express clauses or specific representations, the public
international law premise of the treaty system coupled with the joint sover-
eign nature of the treaty parties means that investors should expect that the
balance of benefits and burdens they receive from investment treaties may
change over time. Investors cannot argue that, in investing, they had a legit-
imate expectation that the investment treaty would continue to cover their
investment, at least for the period of the survival clause. Given the sovereign
nature of states, such an expectation is not “legitimate” and any argument
based on it is circular:
This expectation-based argument . . . is circular. In short, the
argument asserts that people have a right to protection merely
because either they now expect such protection or they expected
such protection when they entered into a transaction; their expec-
tations allegedly create a right and their asserted rights legitimate
their expectations. Often this expectation-based argument
amounts to nothing more than an assertion that the status quo
should be shielded from normal legislative change—an odd claim
since people surely expect legislative change.163
A number of states have recently rolled back protections in their invest-
ment laws, such as by providing that foreign investors may not initiate in-
ternational arbitration unless the relevant government offers its specific
consent.164 So long as the investment law does not contain a stabilization
provision, akin to a survival clause applying to joint termination, investors
cannot complain if they invest and the law subsequently changes.165 The
same is true with respect to termination of investment treaty rights by the
treaty parties as the joint sovereign. Investors may have legitimate expecta-
tions that their investment treaty rights will not be unilaterally terminated
during the period of the survival clause, but they can have no legitimate
expectation that this applies to joint termination absent an express clause to
the contrary.
B. Bringing a Claim?
Should the situation change when a cause of action accrues or a claim is
brought? A number of commentators assert that the treaty parties can re-
voke or modify investment treaties, but only up to the point at which a
claim is made.166 I reject this conclusion, as ideal treaty parties would likely
163. Michael Graetz, Retroactivity Revisited, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 1820, 1823 (1985).
164. Luke Eric Peterson, Growing Number of Governments Are Amending Domestic Investment Laws so as to
Preclude Unilateral Recourse by Investors to International Arbitration, IA Reporter, Sept. 10, 2013, available
at http://www.iareporter.com.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/articles/20130910_2/print.
165. Rumeli Telekom A.S. v. Republic of Kazakhstan, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/16, Award, July 29,
2008, paras. 332–36; Ruby Roz Agricol LLP v Republic of Kazakhstan, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/16,
Award on Jurisdiction, Aug. 1, 2013, paras. 149–68.
166. Voon, Mitchell & Munro, supra note 87.
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wish to retain the power to terminate the treaty and settle these claims,
although they may accept an obligation to pay compensation in certain
cases.
When an investor brings a claim, it not only accepts the host state’s offer
of arbitration, but it relies upon the procedural and substantive rights
granted to it by the treaty. The treaty parties have clear and individualized
knowledge of the investor’s acceptance and reliance at this point. Interna-
tional law generally recognizes that international tribunals have jurisdiction
to determine their own jurisdiction.167 Jurisdiction is typically judged on
the facts and law that apply at the point in time that the claim is filed, and
there is a presumption that joint termination and amendment have prospec-
tive effect only. There is also support under public law for the idea that a
property right in the law might vest when a cause of action accrues, a legal
claim is filed, or a final judgment is issued.168
But, even if we understand investment treaty rights as vesting when a
claim is brought, that does not immunize them from interference by the
joint treaty parties. In contract law, there is some debate about the conse-
quences of a third party’s rights vesting. Some authorities suggest that con-
tracting parties lose their right to modify or revoke a contract after a third
party justifiably relies upon that contract.169 However, others argue that this
approach is mistaken, with reliance rather than expectation damages being
appropriate:
If an empowered beneficiary has justifiably relied on a contract,
the importance of protecting that reliance outweighs the interests
of the contracting parties, but only to the extent of the reli-
ance. . . . The act of bringing suit is simply a special kind of
reliance.  If an empowered beneficiary has brought suit, the prom-
isor should be liable for the beneficiary’s cost of bringing suit, but
should otherwise be free to join with the promisee in varying or
eliminating the beneficiary’s entitlement to any further
damages.170
Whichever is true in the private law context, the presumption in favor of
the ongoing ability of a state to act is clear in the public law context. Even if
an individual is viewed as having a vested property right, the sovereign may
still modify or revoke that right if it acts for the public good and provides
167. See, e.g., Statute of the International Court of Justice, annex to the U.N. Charter, art. 36(6);
ICSID Convention, supra note 76, art. 41. Arbitrators coming from a commercial background are also
likely to be familiar with the concept of the separability of the arbitration agreement, which allows the
arbitration agreement to continue to exist and to found jurisdiction even if the underlying contract is
rendered void.
168. Jeremy Blumenthal, Legal Claims as Private Property: Implications for Eminent Domain, 36 Has-
tings Const. L. Q. 373, 398–400 (2009).
169. See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 311(3).
170. Eisenberg, supra note 38. R
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compensation. Whether that compensation should be determined based on
reliance damages or expectation damages is an open question. In this way,
any expropriation-based doctrine works to preserve sovereignty while creat-
ing a liability mechanism to compensate for reliance interests. Just as this
applies to a single sovereign in a domestic setting, so too it could apply to
joint sovereigns in the treaty setting.
Factors to be considered in determining whether a joint action amounts
to an expropriation of a legal claim include the extent of the interference
with the individual’s property right, the importance of the public interest at
stake, and the extent to which the action interferes with the investors’ legiti-
mate investment-backed expectations. On this analysis, minor amendments
or terminations followed by the substitution of a new investment treaty or a
free trade agreement with an investor chapter would be unlikely to consti-
tute an expropriation. However, major amendments or outright termina-
tions with no replacement provisions or compensation mechanisms might
amount to an expropriation and thereby require compensation.
This schema may help to explain a number of practices that have devel-
oped in the field. For instance, treaty parties have jointly terminated invest-
ment treaties while at the same time providing for new protections in free
trade agreements. Even where the rights in the second treaty are less
favorable to investors than in the first, for instance because they provide the
host state with more regulatory freedom or they do not impose a survival
clause, we have not seen treaty parties seek to compensate existing investors
or investors seek to bring claims.171 Outside the investment treaty context,
we have seen examples of states settling existing and pending claims, but
providing for an alternative forum for those claims to be heard and compen-
sated, such as in the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal,172 or exempting claims that
have already led to final awards.173
Even if an investor’s right is considered to have vested, and even if public
law notions would suggest that an expropriation of that legal claim has
taken place, that does not mean that investor-state tribunals are in a position
to award compensation. Investor-state tribunals do not have jurisdiction to
review directly the legality of joint terminations and amendments or to im-
pose compensation obligations on the treaty parties for such actions. The
treaty parties could give them this power, but to date they have not done so.
Accordingly, joint terminations and amendments might ultimately result in
domestic law claims being brought by investors against their home states for
the expropriation of their legal claims. If so, the permissibility of such
171. See Voon, Mitchell & Munro, supra note 87.
172. See Claims Settlement Declaration, supra note 80. R
173. See, e.g., Claims Settlement Agreement between the Government of the United States of America
and the Government of the Republic of Iraq, Sept. 2, 2010, arts. 2–3, Annex A (providing for extin-
guishment of all claims against Iraq, including those based on international law, as part of a settlement
agreement, but excluding inter alia a claim that had already resulted in a final award), available at http://
www.state.gov/documents/organization/191781.pdf.
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claims and the appropriate measure of compensation will depend on domes-
tic, rather than international, law.
We may see the future development of international law impose limits on
the individual actions of home states or the joint actions of treaty parties in
order to protect rights of non-state actors, as is starting to occur with provi-
sions like Article 19 of the Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection.174 But
such limits do not yet exist as a matter of international law. And even if they
did, it is arguable that they should be limited to protecting reliance inter-
ests rather than providing expectation damages. Investment tribunals may
be reluctant to give up their jurisdiction with respect to previously filed
disputes. However, the hybrid public/private default rules developed here
suggest that this is the course they should adopt if so required by the treaty
parties. If they fail to do so, their decisions could be reviewed by national
courts for excess of jurisdiction or by annulment committees for manifest
excess of powers.
C. Protection as a Matter of Fact, Not Law
Even if standard investment treaties give investors no or limited protec-
tions against the collective actions of the treaty parties as a matter of law,
three reasons suggest that they are likely to benefit from significant protec-
tions as a matter of fact. This further suggests that the failure of treaty
parties to constrain their joint actions legally is unlikely to produce any
hold-up costs with respect to promoting efficient foreign investments.
First, the investors at issue are often powerful multinational companies
that are capable of exercising considerable political influence over their
home states. This should make home states reluctant as a matter of fact to
agree to joint terminations or amendments or to overtake investors’ rights to
bring claims without their investors’ consent. Even when home states legally
override the rights of their investors, we should expect to see them make
some provisions to protect the interests of their investors as a matter of
policy.
For instance, when the United States and Morocco terminated their in-
vestment treaty and replaced it with a free trade agreement, they suspended
the substantive and procedural benefits or rights granted to investors under
the investment treaty.175 However, they created an exception that permitted
investor-state and state-to-state claims arising under the investment treaty
to continue for another ten years from the date of the suspension with re-
spect to existing investments and existing investment disputes.176 There is
no evidence that the United States and Morocco considered themselves le-
174. ILC Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection with Commentaries, supra note 24, art. 19. R
175. United States-Morocco Free Trade Agreement (United States-Morocco FTA), art. 1.2.3, June 15,
2004, HR 4842.
176. Id., art. 1.2.4.
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gally obliged to continue these protections, but they did so as a matter of
policy.
Second, treaty parties will generally have an incentive to amend or jointly
terminate a treaty only where they have relatively symmetrical interests as
both capital importers and capital exporters. Thus, amendment and joint
termination are more likely to occur with respect to treaties between more
evenly situated players, as in NAFTA or with intra-EU agreements, than in
traditional investment treaties between clear capital importers and capital
exporters, like Ecuador-United States or Argentina-United States. It should
be no surprise that interpretive agreements have been most common in
NAFTA,177 while the European Commission has suggested joint termina-
tion of intra-EU BITs.178
Outside of these contexts, investors will continue to have strong protec-
tions against their rights being revoked or modified under most investment
treaties because of the asymmetry of treaty parties’ interests. The permissi-
bility of joint termination and amendment thus works to provide greater
flexibility to already powerful states—like the United States and Western
European states—that may be understood to exist at the system’s core and
lesser flexibility to less powerful states—like Argentina and Ecuador—that
exist at the system’s periphery. This realpolitik analysis mirrors the differen-
tial application of law to players at the center and periphery in other fields,
like financial regulation.179
Third, the bilateral structure of investment treaties makes them particu-
larly sticky when it comes to protecting investors’ rights. For a state to
ensure that it is protected against older-style investment treaties, it must
amend or jointly terminate all of its treaties. This is because (1) some invest-
ment treaties have liberal jurisdictional provisions that have been inter-
preted to permit investors to restructure in order to take advantage of
investment protections under multiple investment treaties and (2) many in-
vestment treaties contain a most-favored-nations provision that allows inves-
tors under one treaty to invoke the most favorable treatment accorded to
investors under any other treaty.
Even if a state is in a position of relative symmetry vis-a`-vis one treaty
party such that amendment or joint termination of an older-style treaty is
possible, sophisticated investors may be able to restructure their investments
in order to qualify for protection under other investment treaties where the
treaty parties’ interests are asymmetrical. The chances that a state will be in
177. See, e.g., NAFTA Free Trade Commission, Notes of Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11 Provi-
sions (July 31, 2001); NAFTA Free Trade Commission, Statement of the Free Trade Commission on
non-disputing party participation (Oct. 17, 2003).
178. See Transitional Arrangements for Bilateral Investment, supra note 86.
179. See, e.g., Katharina Pistor, A Legal Theory of Finance, 41 J. Comp. Econ. 315, 317 (2013) (identi-
fying the way in which law in the financial system tends to apply (1) strictly to less powerful players that
exist at the system’s periphery and (2) with greater elasticity to more powerful players that exist at the
system’s center).
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a position of relative symmetry vis-a`-vis all of its treaty parties is low, which
works to protect sophisticated investors. Investors may also be able to im-
port in more favorable provisions from older-style investment treaties into
newer-style investment treaties, unless the state has limited the most-fa-
vored-nations clause in the newer-style treaties to apply to later-in-time
treaties only.180
Conclusion
This Article set out to answer fundamental and unanswered questions in
the investment treaty system: what rights have been given to investors and
what powers have been retained by the treaty parties acting both individu-
ally and collectively?
Instead of accepting the currently polarized positions of investors having
no rights or absolute rights, I develop a hybrid theory based on a public
international law premise, a third-party-beneficiary paradigm, and a public
law qualification. In doing so, I reconceptualize investment treaties as trian-
gular treaties, i.e., agreements between sovereign states that create enforcea-
ble rights for investors as non-sovereign, third-party beneficiaries. This
tripartite structure allows us to conceptualize investors as having been
granted rights that are both subject to, and yet potentially qualifying of,
certain sovereign powers retained by home and host states acting individu-
ally and the treaty parties acting collectively.
Accordingly, instead of focusing on existing debates about the nature of
investment treaty rights, this Article refocuses our attention on the extent
and limits of those rights. In doing so, it extends the analysis of third-party-
beneficiary rights under public international law and contract law. It also
grapples with how to apply these rules at the interesting, though difficult,
intersection of public and private law at which investment treaties sit. The
triangular structure that I propose can be used to impose significant con-
straints on the individual powers of home states and the joint powers of the
treaty parties. However, there is little evidence that existing treaty parties
do, or ideal treaty parties would, impose radical constraints with respect to
these second- and third-order relationships.
In analyzing these issues, I have argued that traditional theories of the
investment treaty system tend to present a skewed understanding of the
purposes of investment protections and the reasons for and consequences of
introducing investor-state arbitration. The traditional approach focuses only
on the left-hand point of each triangle depicted above. The purpose of in-
vestment treaties is depicted as investment protection, with the assumption
that other goals do not exist or are not as important. The main relationship
analyzed is the investor-host state relationship, with the assumption that
180. For an example of this approach, see 2004 Canada Model BIT, supra note 73, art. 4, Annex III. R
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any limitations accepted on state sovereignty in that context cross-apply to
other contexts. The purpose of depoliticization is depicted as being intended
exclusively or primarily to protect investors with the consequence of immu-
nizing investors’ claims from interference by home states and treaty parties.
A key premise of this Article is that, to comprehend the system’s essential
architecture and the treaty parties’ multifaceted purposes, participants must
step back in order to get a wider view of each triangle. When doing so, it
becomes clear that investment treaties do not seek to protect foreign inves-
tors or promote foreign investment per se. Rather, protection of investors is
a means to the end of promoting foreign investment, and this is a qualified,
rather than absolute, goal. The balance struck between protection and sover-
eignty may differ depending on whether the relationship being analysed is
between the investor and the host state, the home state, or the treaty parties
acting collectively. The purpose of depoliticization is primarily about pro-
tecting home states and secondarily about protecting host states. Thus, the
introduction of investor-state arbitration, without more, enables investors to
bring claims but does not disable home states from bringing claims or im-
munize investors’ claims from the underlying treaty-party relationship.
I have used this triangular understanding of the investment treaty system
and the hybrid theory of investment treaty rights that it produces to provide
answers to a number of controversies that are currently surfacing in treaty
practice and dispute resolution, namely the settlement of investors’ claims,
the permissibility of countermeasures, and the consequences of joint termi-
nation. However, this analysis also provides a template for rethinking ap-
proaches to a range of other controversies, including whether the expansive
approach to defining jurisdiction is in keeping with the purposes of invest-
ment treaties, whether investors can contractually waive their substantive
and procedural rights under an investment treaty in a way that waives the
rights of their home states, and what role national courts should play in
reviewing investment treaty awards as opposed to commercial arbitration
awards. But these issues must wait for another day.
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